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Minority Shareholder Oppression in the
Private Company in the European
Community: A Comparative
Analysis of the German, United
Kingdom, and French "Close
Corporation Problem"
Sandra K. Miller*
The purpose of the European Community is to remove barriers to the free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital in the European
Community.1 With regard to company law, the Treaty calls for "safeguards
. . . for the 2protection of the interests of members and others," and
authorizes the coordination of company rules throughout the
Community. 2 Significant progress has been made in the harmonization of
corporate safeguards involving public filings, financial reporting, auditing,
capitalization, and mergers.3 However, several areas have not been
successfully harmonized, including matters regarding corporate
governance and remedies for resolving disputes among shareholders of
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J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, 1978; M.S., American University Graduate
School of Business, 1981; LL.M., Villanova University School of Law, 1990. The author
wishes to acknowledge the helpful research assistance of Michelle Curtis and wishes to
thank Veronika Zinsmaier for her help in translating German court decisions. The
author also appreciates the complimentary services provided by LEXIS/NEXIS.
1. Article 2 of The Treaty of Rome mandates that a common market be established.
It provides in part that:
[tihe Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the
States belonging to it.
TREAT-Y FSTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMuNn-Y, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 2, 298
U.N.T.S 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY], amended by Single European Act, 1987 Oj. (L
169/1), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741, and Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 Oj.
(C 224), [19921 1 C.M.L.1. 573 (1992).
2. EEC TREATY art. 54(3)(g).
3. For an excellent survey of these areas, see Alfred F. Conard, The European
Alternative To Uniformity In Corporation Laws, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2150 (1991) (discussing
the Communities' development of minimum standards in such areas as public
recording, financial disclosure, mergers, takeovers, and shareholder and employee
powers).
30 CoRmNu. ITLr' .J. 381 (1997)
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private companies. 4
While a great deal of attention has focused on the problems of
shareholder squeeze outs, deadlocks, and disputes in the close corporation
in the United States, little attention has focused on the same issues which
arise in other countries, and in particular, in the European Community. 5
In fact, the "close corporation problem"6 is universal-regardless of the
country of domicile, shareholders of the private company typically lack
liquidity in their investments. 7 If a dispute arises among shareholders, the
shareholders are frequently locked into the company. Minority
shareholders in particular are vulnerable to the conduct of the majority
owners.8
The primary purpose of this Article is to explore the different ways in
which selected countries within the European Community address the
"close corporation problem." The corporate structure and shareholder
dispute mechanisms in the private company under German, United
Kingdom (UK), and French law are considered. The Article suggests that
members of the Community consider the modification of company statutes
to require or otherwise encourage shareholders to contractually address
shareholder disputes in advance of their occurrence. Part I of this Article
identifies the "close corporation problem" as a universal dilemma found in
the United States as well as in other countries. Part II analyzes the
corporate structure of German, UK, and French public and private
corporations. Each country's remedies for shareholder disputes in the
private company are considered. Part III explores the burdens and
benefits of existing judicial discretion in resolving close corporation
shareholder disputes, focusing on: 1) the potential for abuse of judicial
discretion; 2) the confusion fostered by vague legal standards in an
international context; 3) the rationale for judicial discretion in the dispute
resolution process; and 4) the extent to which contractual arrangements
can effectively address the close corporation problem. Part IV explores the
4. A consensus has not been reached on the Fifth Council Directive which provides
a unified corporate structure and establishes rules for corporate governance. See The
European Company Statute, 1989 OJ. (C 263) 41; Amended Proposal for a Fifth
Council Directive, 1991 OJ. (No. C 138) at 8 & 1991 OJ. (C 176) at 1 [hereinafter Fifth
Directive].
5. See Hugh T. Scogin, Withdrawal and Expulsion in Germany: A Comparative
Perspective on the "Close Corporation Problem," 15 MICH.J. INT'L L. 127 (1993) (providing
a comparative analysis of US and German law relating to remedies for shareholder
disputes in the private corporation).
6. For the purposes of this Article, the term "close corporation problem" refers to
the judicial and practical difficulties raised by shareholder disputes among members of
a close corporation. A close corporation is defined in accordance with PRINCIPLES OF
CoRPoRATE GovERNANcE § 1.06 (1994) as a corporation whose equity securities are
owned by a small number of persons, and whose securities do not have an active trading
market.
7. F. Hodge O'Neal identified the unique issues faced by the U.S. close corporation
and identified the close corporation problem or dilemma. He also proposed remedies
for the minority shareholder. See F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing
Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAw. 873 (1978).
8. See discussion infra Part .
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feasibility of harmonizing the laws governing close corporation
shareholder disputes within the European Community. Part V
recommends strategies to improve existing approaches to close corporation
shareholder dispute resolution.
I. The Universal Nature of the "Close Corporation Problem"
Generally, a close corporation is a corporation whose stock is not publicly
traded.9 The stock of the close corporation is typically owned by a small
number of shareholders.' 0 The directors, officers, and shareholders may
in some cases be the same individuals." In the United States, most busi-
nesses are closely-held corporations and a large percentage of these entities
are family-owned. 12 Approximately fifty percent of the U.S. population is
employed by close corporations. 13 In the industrialized countries, small
and medium-sized companies comprise a major segment of business.' 4
Although close corporations are clearly an important part of the economy
in the European Union, relatively little attention has focused on the special
problems faced by such entities.
Shareholder disputes present one of the most difficult and potentially
destructive problems which arise in the context of the close corporation. 15
A U.S. study conducted in Chicago, Illinois revealed that shareholder dis-
9. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT THoMpsON, O'NEAi's CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02
(3d ed. 1990) (discussing the types of organizations which are typically dosely-held.
Close corporations are corporations whose shares are not publicly traded in the securi-
ties market. It is noted that the great majority of corporations in the United States are
close corporations.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Adam Chernichaw, Oppressed Shareholders in Close Corporations: A Market-Ori-
ented Statutory Remedy, 16 CARDozo L REv. 501 (1994) (providing an overview of the
close corporation in the U.S.).
13. Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate
Equitable Remedy, 15J. CORP. L. 285, 287 (1990) (discussing the importance of the close
corporation to the U.S. economy).
14. See Marco Biagi, Labour Law In Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: Flexibility
or Adjustment?, 16 COMP. LAB. J. 439 (1995) (focusing on small and medium enter-
prises and employee representation within such enterprises). Small and medium-sized
businesses defined as those with fewer than 499 employees represent more than 95% of
all units of production in industrialized nations. Id. Companies with nine workers
employ 41.3% of the working population in Spain; 40.3% in Italy; 35.7% in Portugal;
31% in Belgium; 22.3% in France; 18.2% in Germany; 19.1% in Great Britain; and
19.4% in the Netherlands. Id. at 439-40. While these statistics do not specify whether
entities with nine or fewer employees are privately owned, it is quite likely that compa-
nies which employ as few as nine employees are not publicly-owned.
15. See O'NFL & THOmisON, supra note 9, § 9.02 (indicating that dissension among
shareholders has a heavy impact on dose corporations). The consequences of such
dissension are especially significant in the close corporation context since shareholders
often have a high percentage of their personal wealth invested in the corporation and the
corporation frequently provides the principal source of salary to the shareholder. Id.
Additionally, shareholders often work closely together and have personal and/or family
relationships with one another. Id.
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sension was a major cause of business failures for the close corporation. 16
Shareholder disputes are responsible for a wide variety of business
problems including loss of management time and increased costs. 17 The
problem of shareholder dissension is not unique to the United States.18
Several countries within the European Community have witnessed similar
problems in connection with the European limited liability company-the
private business entity which most closely parallels the U.S. close
corporation. 19
16. Bahls, supra note 13, at 287 (citing a major study by Professor John L. Ward of
Loyola University which indicated that "eighty percent of the Chicago area family-owned
corporations that were in existence in 1924 and had at least twenty employees were no
longer going concerns in 1984.") Major reasons cited for business failure included fam-
ily problems, and competition between generations. Id.
17. Id. at 287.
18. See Deborah A. DeMott, Oppressed But Not Betrayed: A Comparative Assessment of
Canadian Remedies For Minority Shareholders and Other Corporate Constituents, 56 LAw
& CoNTEMP. PROBS. 181 (1993) (including an analysis of Canadian remedies for minor-
ity shareholders); Greta M. Fung, A Common Goal From Two Different Paths: Protection of
Minority Shareholders in Delaware and Canada, 57 ALB. L. REv. 41 (1993) (comparing the
remedies for minority shareholders in Canada and the United States with a focus on the
public company). See Zipora Cohen, Fiduciary Duties of Controlling Shareholders: A
Comparative View, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 379 (1991) (comparing fiduciary duties in
England, America, and Israel).
19. Most European nations draw a sharp distinction between the publicly-held cor-
poration and the closely-held limited liability company. Typically, the European limited
liability company possesses the corporate characteristics of limited liability, centralized
management, and continuity of life whereunder the entity continues even upon the
death or bankruptcy of a member. See also LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BusiNESS IN WESr-
ERN EUROPE 209-12 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1983). The German Gesellschaft mit
beschrankter Haftung (GmbH) provides the prototype for many limited liability compa-
nies throughout the world. See Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrinkter
Haftung (Act on Limited Liability Companies), v.10.5.1994 (BGBI. I 2922) (F.R.G.),
translated in 1 BusiNEss TRANSACIONS IN GERMANY App. 6 (Dennis Campbell et al., 1994).
The German GmbH bears many of the same characteristics as the U.S. close corporation.
Both the U.S. close corporation and the GmbH provide for centralized management,
although the shareholders may in some cases serve as members of the Board of Direc-
tors. Id. at Sec. 6. They possess continuity of life and do not dissolve upon death or
bankruptcy of the members. Further, they both enjoy limited liability. The typical lim-
ited liability company in the United States more closely resembles the European limited
partnership than the European limited liability company. Driven largely by tax-related
reasons, the U.S. limited liability company possesses the corporate characteristic of lim-
ited liability, but is structured to avoid other corporate characteristics such as continuity
of life, and free transferability of interests. Many U.S. LLCs also lack centralized man-
agement. The U.S. limited liability company has been deliberately structured to resem-
ble a partnership. Like partners, members of the LLC often have control of
management either because the limited liability company members choose to manage
the business themselves, or they employ managers to manage the entity. Some state
statutes vest management in proportion to capital contributions, while others defer to
the operating agreement with regard to management rights. See Amuz. R v. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-682 (West 1995) (providing for management pursuant to the operating agreement);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17001 (West 1996); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West 1995)(providing for management by a manager, except as otherwise provided); DE.. CODE
AiN. tit. 18, § 18-402 (West Supp. 1996) (providing for management vesting in its mem-
bers in proportion to the then current percentage or other interest in profits unless
otherwise provided in the operating agreement, and also permitting management by
managers chosen by the members in accordance with the operating agreement); FLA.
Vol. 30
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There are several key features of the limited liability company in
Europe and the close corporation in the United States that create a founda-
tion for shareholder dissension. Perhaps the most fundamental factor that
gives rise to many private company problems is the absence of the influ-
ence of a market mechanism.20 A dissatisfied shareholder of a public cor-
poration has a ready market where stock may be sold.21 Further, the
marketplace provides an important incentive to maximize shareholder
returns for the public entity.22 Further, the parties who are stockholders of
the public company typically do not serve as Board members or manag-
ers.23 This segregation of ownership and management diminishes the
opportunity for self-interested dealing on the part of management.24
Finally, European public corporations are subject to substantial formalities
and accounting controls which provide increased scrutiny and accountabil-
STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1997) (providing for management vesting in members
in proportion to their contributions to capital unless otherwise provided in the articles
of organization, and also permitting management by annually elected manager); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1312-13 (West 1996) (providing for management by members,
except as otherwise provided, and also permitting management by managers); MwiN.
STAT. ANN. § 322B.67 (West 1995) (requiring that the limited liability company must
have one or more natural persons exercising the functions of the offices however desig-
nated of chief manger and treasurer); Nay. REV. STAT. 'AN. § 86.291 (Michie Supp.
1995) (vesting management in members in proportion to their contribution to capital,
permitting annually elected managers); OKL.. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2013-15 (West Supp.
1997) (permitting management by manager or member); TEx. R'v. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n, art. 2.09 (West Supp. 1997) (authorizing regulations of limited liability company
to govern management and business); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2a-126 (1992) (providing
for operating agreement for management and conduct of business); V. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-1023, 1024 (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing for operating agreement and man-
agement by manager or members); W. VA. CODE § 31-lA-18 (1996) (providing that
unless otherwise provided, the members shall vote in proportion to their contributions,
and management may be by members or by managers); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §17-15-116
(Michie Supp. 1996) (providing for management by members in proportion to their con-
tribution to capital, but also permitting management by manager). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the similarity between the GrbH and the U.S. close corporation, see Scogin,
supra note 5, at 133 n.20.
The GmbH Law of 1892 provides for many of the attributes that later character-
ized the U.S. close corporation statutes. This aspect of German company law
was widely noted in U.S. legal literature at the time those statutes were formu-
lated .... The U.S. Limited Liability Company, however, is much closer in its
structure and operation to a limited partnership than is a GmbH. The German
courts have stressed the distinction between the limited partnership and the
GmbH in discussing dispute resolution issues.
Id. at 133 n.20, n.21.
20. Bahls, supra note 13, at 288-89 (discussing illiquidity and the plight of the
minority shareholder).
21. See Krishnan S. Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh Approach,
10 HAiv. J.L. & PuB. Poi'y 129, 134-35 (1987) (indicating that the minority investors of
public companies may sell their shares, but that the minority of a close corporation is
left without such stystemic protection).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 161-62 (emphasizing that the quasi-adversarial relationship between share-
holders and management of the public corporation operates as a strong constraining
factor which deters management form enriching itself at the expense of investors).
24. Id.
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ity of management.25
In contrast to the stock of the public corporation, the stock of a private
company has no ready market.26 Each owner is dependent on the other to
buy out the ownership interest in the event of a dispute. 27 Further, the
controlling shareholders are likely to be the dominant members of the
Board of Directors. The dual role played by dominant shareholders of the
private company as both owners and Board members creates a climate
which fosters self-interested conduct. The relaxed corporate structure of
the private European limited liability company provides an environment in
which opportunistic conduct by majority owners may flourish. The doc-
trine of majority rule creates the possibility for majority shareholders to
make decisions which further their own interests at the expense of the
minority owners. Self-interested dealing has taken many forms such as the
personal appropriation of corporate assets, removal of minority sharehold-
ers from company management, refusal to pay dividends, and termination
of salary and/or employment. 28
The problems faced by the minority shareholder of the U.S. close cor-
poration have been addressed through both case law and remedial legisla-
tion. First, through judicial construction, partnership-like fiduciary duties
have been imposed on the majority shareholder.29 In Meinhard v.
Salmon,30 then Judge Cardozo stated that "U]oint adventurers, like copart-
25. See infra Part II.
26. See In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (observing
that "[a]s the stock of closely held corporations generally is not readily salable, a minor-
ity shareholder at odds with management policies may be without either a voice in pro-
tecting his or her interests or any reasonable means of withdrawing his or her
investment"). See also John E. Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York: Liberalizing
the Rights of Minority Shareholders, 56 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 24, 27 (1981). Noting that:
To the [minority's] dismay, however, disagreement ultimately may develop and
the minority shareholder may find himself removed from his directorship,
office, and employment by action of the controlling faction .... The shares of
the close corporation typically do not return a dividend. Moreover, since a
minority position in a close corporation, unlike its publicly held counterpart,
usually lacks marketability, the shareholder is frustrated by the realization that
he cannot sell his shares.
Id.
27. Id. (noting that the minority shareholder lacks liquidity and in many cases may
receive an offer from the controlling shareholder to purchase his or her shares at a price
the minority believes is inequitable).
28. See infra Part II. For an interesting survey of involuntary dissolution cases, see
Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits As A Remedy For
Close Corporation Dissension, 35 Ciav. ST. L. Rev. 25, 50-56 (1987) (reporting a nation-
wide survey of involuntary dissolution cases in 1984 and 1985). Remedies for deadlock
and squeeze-outs and misapplication of corporate assets were considered. Id. A buy-out
was ordered in fifty-four percent of the cases reviewed. Roughly forty percent involved
dissension in family-owned businesses. Id.
29. For an excellent discussion of the remedies for oppressive conduct see Robert B.
Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action For Oppression, 48 Bus. Law. 699 (1993)
(analyzing and comparing the remedy for judicial dissolution and the direct action for a
breach of fiduciary duty); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in
Close Corporations, U. PA. L REv. 1675 (1990) (examining the judicial analysis employed
in actions for breach of fiduciary duty).
30. 164 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1928).
386
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ners, owe to one another ... the duty of finest loyalty .... Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior."3 1 In the seminal case Donahoe v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 32 this
"heightened" fiduciary duty was extended to close corporation sharehold-
ers.33 Second, remedial statutory and judicial remedies have evolved to
protect minority shareholders from oppressive conduct by the majority.34
31. Id. at 546.
32. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975) (noting the similarity between partners and the
owners of close corporations).
33. For an early case in which majority owners are regarded as having a fiduciary
duty to the minority, see Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919). See also
Helms v. Duckworht, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (comparing close corporation
shareholders to joint venturers); Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So.2d 618 (Fla. App.
1981) (recognizing a majority shareholder fiduciary duty); Comolli v. Comolli, 246
S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978) (imposing a good faith requirement with regard to minority
shareholders); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976)
(involving a minority shareholder whose salary was terminated and who was voted out
as an officer and director of the- company); Fought v. Morris, 543 So.2d 167 (Miss.
1989) (imposing a standard of intrinsic fairness upon majority shareholders); Crosby v.
Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989) (extending a heightened fiduciary duty to close
corporation shareholders). Perhaps the most noteworthy and eloquent description of
the fiduciary duty that the majority shareholders owe to minority shareholders is found
in Jones v. H.F. Ahamanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3rd 93, 108, 81 Cal. Reptr. 592, 599, 460 P.2d
464, 471 (1969), in which Chief Justice Traynor held:
[M]ajority shareholders, either singly or acting in concert to accomplish a joint
purpose, have a fiduciary responsibility to the minority and to the corporation
to use their ability to control the corporation in a fair, just and equitable man-
ner. Majority shareholders may not use their power to control corporate activi-
ties to benefit themselves alone or in a manner detrimental to the minority. Any
use to which they put the corporation or their power to control the corporation
must benefit all shareholders proportionately and must not conflict with the
proper conduct of the corporation's business.
34. For an excellent discussion of the special problems encountered by the minority
shareholder, see O'Neal, supra note 7, at 873 (providing an overview of the status of
legislation applicable to closely-held corporations and emphasizing the need to protect
shareholders who fail to expressly contract for protection). See also Frank H. Easter-
brook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STaN. L. Rxv. 271
(1986) (providing an overview of cost management of close corporations); Robert H.
Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant In The Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of
the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 Mui. L. Rrv. 1, 75
(1982) (discussing the problems encountered by the dose corporation and partnership
and the importance of the reasonable expectation test as a measure of oppressive con-
duct); John D. Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York: Liberalizing the Rights of
Minority Shareholders, 56 ST. Join's L. Rav. 25 (1981) (providing an overview of the
development of New York Legislation enhancing the rights of minority shareholders);
Victor B. Brudeney & Marvin A. Chirlstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freeze-outs, 87
YALE LJ. 1354 (1978) (providing an overview of corporate freezeouts largely from the
perspective of the public corporation, including a discussion of transactions involving
going private). For a discussion of the definition of "oppressive conduct" by majority
shareholders, see O'NEa. & THo~wsoN, supra note 9, §§ 9.02, 9.29, 9.30. O'Neal and
Thompson explain that some courts provide relief to the minority shareholder if his or
her reasonable expectations have been dissapointed. Thus, if the minority shareholder
reasonably expected to take an active role in corporate management, if the majority fires
the minority or fails to permit the minority to maintain a position as an officer, such
conduct may be characterized as oppressive. The reasonable expectation standard
arguably fosters sensitivity on the part of courts to the perils faced by participants who
have concentrated their financial and human resources in a close corporation which
Cornell International Law Journal
Such remedies include judicial corporate dissolution or other less drastic
remedies.35 The Model Business Corporation Act provides for both volun-
tary and judicial dissolution.36 Judicial dissolution may be permitted if the
directors are deadlocked in the management of corporate affairs, and irrep-
arable injury is threatened.37 Judicial dissolution may also be granted if
the conduct of the directors or those in control of the corporation is illegal,
oppressive or fraudulent.38 In addition, a number of states provide liberal
dissenter's rights awarding minority shareholders the fair market value of
their shares. 39
provides no easy answer when dissension occurs. It is maintained that by focusing on
the reasonable expectations of the participants, courts have a clearer, more specific stan-
dard to apply in resolving disputes.
35. See Joshua M. Henderson, Note, Buyout Remedy For Oppressed Minority Share-
holders, 47 S.C. L. REV. 195 (1995) (reviewing the remedy of judicial dissolution with
particular emphasis on South Carolina law).
36. See MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§ 14.01, 14.30 (1996). Section 14.30 sets forth
the grounds for involuntary dissolution as follows:
The [name or describe court or courts] may dissolve a corporation:
(1) in a proceeding by the attorney general if it is established that:
(i) the corporation obtained its articles of incorporation through fraud; or
(ii) the corporation has continued to exceed or abuse the authority conferred
upon it by law;
(2) in a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that:
(i) the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs,
the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and irreparable injury to
the corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and affairs of
the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the sharehold-
ers generally, because of the deadlock;
(ii) the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting,
or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent;
(iii) the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have failed, for a
period that includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect
successors to directors whose terms have expired; or
(iv) the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted;
(3) in a proceeding by a creditor if it is established that:
(i) the creditor's claim has been reduced to judgment, the execution on the
judgment returned unsatisfied, and the corporation is insolvent; or
(ii) the corporation has admitted in writing that the creditor's claim is due
and owing and the corporation is insolvent; or
(4) in a proceeding by the corporation to have its voluntary dissolution contin-
ued under court supervision.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 14.30, at 14-112 (indicating in a statutory comparison as
of December 1, 1995, that all jurisdictions make provision for involuntary dissolution of
corporations in defined circumstances, most commonly including the circumstances
enumerated in the Model Act for deadlock, instances of abuse of corporate powers, or
waste of corporate assets). All but six jurisdictions follow the Model Act pattern that any
shareholder may bring an action for judicial dissolution. Id. A few jurisdictions such as
Massachusetts and Nevada condition the suits upon ownership percentages. Id. Dela-
ware, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Puerto Rico provide for a dissolution proceeding by the
attorney general upon his own motion or that of a proper party. New Hampshire's new
Corporations Act excludes "oppression" as a ground for dissolution. See N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 293-A:14.30(b) (1993).
37. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 14.30(2) (1996).
38. Id. § 14.30(2)(ii).
39. Id. § 13.02 (providing that "[a] shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and
obtain payment for the fair value of his shares in the event of" a variety of circumstances
Vol. 30
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Although not widely used,40 the Model Business Corporation Close
Corporation Supplement has been developed for elective use by close cor-
porations. 4' The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement provides
for dissolution at will or upon the occurrence of a specified contingency. 42
Further, court action is authorized if the conduct of the directors or those
in control is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent or unfairly prejudicial to the
including: 1) certain mergers; 2) share exchanges; 3) sale or exchange of property of the
corporation other than in the usual course of business; and 4) amendments of the arti-
cles of incorporation that materially and adversely affect the shareholder's rights in
specified circumstances). The statutory comparison as of December 1, 1995, following
§ 13.02 indicates that all jurisdictions grant dissenters' rights in many merger situa-
tions. Id. at 13-19. Forty-five states follow the Model Act pattern of making dissenters'
rights available following a plan of merger requiring shareholder approval including Ala-
bama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id. For examples, see DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1992) (awarding appraisal rights in certain cases involving mergers
and consolidations); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300 (West 1996); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1571 (a), (b) (1996) (generally providing for the payment of fair market value of
shares of stock to dissenting shareholders and outlining exceptions including sharehold-
ers holding certain stock listed on the national securities exchange or held by more than
2,000 shareholders).
40. See Tara J. Wortman, Note, Unlocking Lock-in: Limited Liability Companies and
The Key To Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1362 (1995)
(indicating that most close corporations organize under the general corporation
statutes).
41. See 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. Act ANN., Model Close Corporation Supp. § 40 (1996).
A number of states have adopted some form of statutory relief specifically tailored for
the close corporation. Some states offer protection to minority shareholders not only in
their capacity as shareholders, directors, or officers, but also in their capacity as employ-
ees. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West 1996) (permitting appointment of a cus-
todian, a provisional director or an order to sell the corporation stock). Dissolution is
available where a corporation has 25 or fewer shareholders, where "the directors or
those in control have acted fraudulently or illegally, [have] mismanaged the corporation
or [have] abused their authority as officers or directors, or have acted oppressively or
unfairly toward one or more minority shareholders in their capacities as shareholders,
directors, officers, or employees)." Id. See also 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1767 (1996)
(providing for the appointment of a custodian of a corporation on deadlock, or other
causes including where "the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted
illegally, oppressively, or fraudulently toward one or more holders or owners of 5% or
more of the outstanding shares of any class of the corporation in their capacities as
shareholders, directors, officers, or employees.") Under the Amended Committee Com-
ment-1990 to the Pennsylvania provision, it is indicated that the Pennsylvania statute
was modeled in part after New Jersey Law. Id. cmt. The comment notes that the exten-
sion of protection of minority shareholders in their capacity as employees departs from
the Model Business Corporation Act which eliminates relief in the capacity as employee
but continues relief for officers. Id. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352(a)(1) (1991)
(providing for the appointment of a custodian for a close corporation in part if the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation are managed by the stockholders and they are so
divided the business of the corporation is suffering or is threatened with irreparable
injury).
42. 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. Act ANN., Model Close Corporation Supp. § 33 (1996).
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petitioner.43
The close corporation problem remains a concern in the United States
despite the growing popularity of the U.S. limited liability company
(LLC). 44 Because of the high potential tax costs of corporate liquidations,
many U.S. close corporations cannot afford to convert to the LLC struc-
ture.45 Further, although the LLC member is typically entitled to receive
the fair market value for his or her interest upon withdrawal,46 disputes
may arise regarding the nature and scope of the member's exit rights. In
43. Id. § 40. Two levels of judicial relief may be obtained if the conditions of Section
40 have been satisfied. Section 41 provides for Ordinary Relief and Section 42 provides
for Extraordinary Relief. Ordinary Relief consists of a variety of remedies including:
1) The performance, prohibition, alteration, or setting aside of any action of the
corporation or of its share-holders, directors, or officers or any other party to the
proceeding;
2) the cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corporation's articles of
incorporation or by-laws;
3) the removal from office of any director or officer,
4) the appointment of any individual as a director or officer,
5) an accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
6) the appointment of a custodian to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation;
7) the appointment of a provisional director (who has the rights, powers and
duties of a duly elected director to serve for the term and under the conditions
prescribed by the court);
8) the payment of dividends;
9) the award of damages to any aggrieved party.
Id. Extraordinary relief in Section 43 consists of dissolution, unless the stock of the
aggrieved shareholder is purchased by the remaining shareholder or shareholders pur-
suant to Section 42. A statutory comparison as of December 1, 1995, reveals that a
number of states have integrated close corporation statutes including Alabama, Arizona,
California, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Nevada,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
44. See Dennis S. Karjala, Planning Problems in the Limited Liability Company, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 455, 467 (1995) (indicating that the close corporation problem is likely
to resurface in the LLC. Although under default statutes, members of the LLC may have
a right to withdraw from the LLC, the withdrawal rights may be subject to limitations.
Members may well disagree on the meaning and scope of withdrawal rights. As a practi-
cal matter, the dissatisfied LLC member may end up holding an illiquid investment. Id.
at 468.
45. See I.R.C. §§ 336,331 (1995) (providing a network of taxation which results in a
double taxation of corporate liquidations). The corporation itself is taxed on liquida-
tion of its assets, whether sold to the shareholder(s) or to a third party. Id. In addition,
the shareholders are taxed on an individual basis when they receive a liquidating distri-
bution. Consequently, the liquidation of a corporation can be extremely costly, exacting
a tax on both individual and corporate levels. Id.
46. CALIF. CoRP. CODE § 17058 (West 1996) (upon a withdrawal that does not cause
a dissolution, the withdrawing member is entitled to receive amounts in accordance with
the operating agreement, and if not otherwise provided, payment of the fair market value
of the member's interest); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 604 (West Supp. 1995) (providing
that except as otherwise provided in the subchapter, a resigning member is entitled to
receive any distribution in accordance with the operating agreement, and if not other-
wise provided is entitled to receive the fair value of his interest based upon his right to
share in distributions from the limited liability company); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12:1325, 12:1327 (West 1996) (providing for payment of fair value of interest upon
withdrawal, but subject to restrictions on distributions outlined in section 1327 disal-
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addition, some LLCs may be established for a term of years or until the
accomplishment of a specific undertaking. 47 In such event, the member
may have no buy-out rights prior to the occurrence of the stated event or
the passage of time.48 Clearly, like the minority shareholder in the dose
corporation, the minority or passive owner of the U.S. LLC bears a risk of
majority misconduct.49 The informal structure of the LLC, coupled with
the doctrine of majority rule provide the opportunity for the majority
owner to take advantage of minority and/or passive owners.50 Unfortu-
nately, unlike the corporate statutes, most state LLC statutes do not pro-
vide for judicial dissolution in the event of oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial majority conduct.5 '
lowing withdrawals to the extent the company's total assets would be less than its
liabilities).
47. See UmF. LuirrE LIALIu-f CoMPANY Acr (1995) § 101(2), 6A U.L.A. 425, 4334
(1995).
48. Id. The Uniform Act creates a distinction between limited liability companies
established "at- will" and a "term company" in which the members have agreed to
remain members until the expiration of a term specified in the articles of organization.
Sec. 101(2) describes the at will entity and Sec. 101(19) establishes a term company.
Section 701(a)(1) broadly provides for the limited liability company to purchase the
member's interest in an at will company, but under Section 701(a) (2) the company is
not obligated to purchase the member's interest in a term company until the expiration of
the term specified. This can create an illiquid investment for the member of a term lim-
ited liability company member.
49. Karjala, supra note 44, at 466 (indicating that both active and inactive partici-
pants have goals and needs which may change over the life of the business). Circum-
stances change, and control may shift from one generation to another. Divorce, and
other personal disputes present jurisprudential problems in the private business enter-
prise. Id.
50. See Chittur, supra note 21, at 171 (recommending that the majoritarian model
and the business judgment rule be discarded in close corporation context).
51. In Delaware, and in a number of other states, judicial dissolution may be granted
whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with a
limited liability company agreement. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(1) (1993). The
determination of whether it is reasonably practicable to carry on the business depends
on the facts and circumstances. See, e.g., PC Tower Center, Inc. v. Tower Center Dev.
Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, CIV.A No. 10788, 1989 WL 63901 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1989)
(holding that it was not reasonably practicable to carry on business where the value of
the partnership's property was less than the debt and liens encumbering the property
and where the principal tenant was insolvent). Many states other than Delaware provide
for involuntary dissolution of the limited liability company if it is no longer practicable
to carry on business in conformity with the limited liability company agreement. See,
e.g., Amiz. STAT. ANN. § 29-785 (West 1996); CAL. CoRPS. CODE § 17351 (West 1996). In
contrast, only a small handful of state limited liability company statutes in the United
States provide for judicial dissolution when those in control act in an illegal, oppressive,
fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial manner. See UNF. LmrrEn LiABirry COMPANY Act
(1995) § 801(5)(v), 6A U.L.A. 425, 482 (1995). See also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322B.03(11) (West 1995); IDAHO CODE § 53-643(2) (1996); CALIF. CORP. CODE
§ 17351(2), (5) (West 1996). For an in depth discussion of the vulnerability of the
minority member of the limited liability company in the U.S., see Sandra K. Miller, What
Remedies Should Be Made Available To The Dissatisfied Participant In A Limited Liability
Company? 44 AM. L. REv. 465 (1994); Sandra K Miller, What Standards of Conduct
Should Apply To Members and Managers of Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 21 (1994). See also Karjala, supra note 44, at 455. It should be noted that most
limited liability companies in the United States permit the assignment of a membership
Cornell International Law Journal
As with most state corporate laws in the United States, the company
laws of Germany, the UK, and France reveal both statutory and judicial
efforts to address shareholder dissension in the private limited liability
company.52 Even though Germany is a civil law country, a substantial
body of law has evolved over the past seventy years to address private com-
pany shareholder disputes. The UK company law53 gives the judiciary sub-
stantial discretion to develop equitable remedies to redress private
shareholder grievances.5 4 The French statute offers the option of judi-
cially-ordered dissolution.55 In spite of the significance of the dose corpo-
ration problem in these European countries, the European Community has
made no attempt to provide a unified remedy. At present, there appears to
be considerable diversity in the way individual countries address the
problems of shareholder dissension and overreaching by the majority
shareholders. The remedial measures that have been taken rest largely on
judicial discretion which creates an undesirable degree of uncertainty in
the law.
interest but the assignee is unable to participate in management rights without the con-
sent of the other members. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-702 (West 1995) (provid-
ing the membership interest is personal property and is assignable or transferrable,
however the assignee has no right to participate in the business affairs of the limited
liability company or to become a member unless unanimous consent is obtained from
the other members); DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 18-702 (Supp. 1995) (providing in part
that an assignee has no right to participate in management of the business and affairs of
a limited liability company except as provided in the limited liability company agree-
ment and the approval of all members is obtained or there is compliance with any proce-
dure in the limited liability company agreement); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.432 (West Supp.
1995) (providing that an interest in a limited liability company may be transferred or
assigned as provided in the operating agreement). However, if the other members do
not approve of the transfer by unanimous written consent, the transferee of the interest
has no right to participate in management of the business and affairs of the company or
to become a member. The transferee is entitled only to receive the share of profits or
other compensation. Id. For similar provisions, see KAN. STAT. AnN. § 17-17618 (1995)
(limiting assignee's right to participate in management); .. Rv. SAT. ANN. § 1332 (West
1996) (except if otherwise required in the operating agreement an assignee does not
become a member or participate in management absent unanimous written consent of
other members); MD. CODE ANN., CoRPs & ASS'NS §§ 4A-603, 604 (Supp. 1995) (prevent-
ing the assignee from participating in management absent agreement to the contrary);
MuN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.313 Subd. 2 (West 1995) (requiring unanimous consent of
members before assignee may obtain management rights); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 86.351 (Michie 1995) (preventing the transferee from becoming a member absent
unanimous consent of other members); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2035 (West 1995) (provid-
ing that an assignee may become a member as provided in the operating agreement, and
absent such provision may become a member only by written instrument dated and
signed by the member, or evidenced by a vote taken at a meeting); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-
122 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1996) (requiring unanimous consent for assignee of manage-
ment rights).
52. See infra Part II.
53. See Companies Act 1985, pt. XVII, § 459.
54. Id.
55. See infra note 148.
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II. The Corporate Structure and the Close Corporation Problem: A
Comparative Analysis of German, UK, and French Law
A close look at the corporate structures under German, French, and UK
law reveals significant differences in corporate organization. Germany and
France tend to have the most formalistic corporate structures while the UK
has the least restrictive organizational form.56 In all countries considered,
the public corporation is subject to considerable formalities. The private
limited liability companies enjoy a considerable degree of informality in
the way in which business may be conducted.
With regard to standards of conduct for shareholders, German law is
the most exacting of all three countries. All three countries have developed
equitable remedies to resolve shareholder disputes (i.e., shareholder buy-
outs, corporate dissolutions). Under German law, a shareholder may with-
draw himself, or may seek an expulsion of a fellow shareholder upon a
showing of "substantial causes."57 The substantial causes pertain largely
to the personal characteristics of the shareholder and focus on the personal
relationship between the parties.58 In contrast, equitable remedies under
UK law do not focus on the personal characteristics of the shareholder, but
rather on the conduct of the shareholder in the course of managing the
business.59 UK law broadly provides for equitable remedies where the
shareholder's conduct of the company's affairs has been "unfairly prejudi-
cial" to the other members.60 France has also enacted remedies for the
shareholder of the private company. French law provides for anticipatory
dissolution of a company for "valid reasons" including nonperformance of
one's obligations or discord among members. 61
A. The German Corporation: A Two-Tiered Structure for Public
Companies
The German legal system may be described as a civil law system governed
primarily by statute.62 The laws governing business entities are found in
specific statutes. 63 The German equivalent of the publicly-held US corpo-
ration is known as the public limited company (Aktiengesellschaft or AG).
56. See infra notes 89, 108-10.
57. See infra note 78.
58. See infra notes 80-81.
59. See infra notes 125-29.
60. See infra notes 130-31.
61. See infra note 148.
62. The Civil Law system is derived from Roman law after the Roman pattern ius
civile and like all European continental law rests on codffied statutory law. As in other
Civil law systems, technically case law in Germany is not legally binding. For an excel-
lent description of the German legal system, see 1 BusitEss TPAusAcrloNs iN G MAMvo ,
supra note 19, §§ 4.03(2), 4.06(1) (Dennis Campbell et al. eds., 1994). The major legal
codes of the Federal Republic of Germany consist of the Civil Code (Birgerliches
Gesetzbuch/BGB), the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzabuch/HGB) and the Criminal
Code (Strafgesetzbuch/StGB). A variety of additional specialized statutes also exist. It
has been observed that German case law has assumed an important and independent
role. See id. § 4.06(1).
63. Id. § 4.03(2).
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The AG has a two-tiered management system consisting of a Supervisory
Board (Aufsichstsrat) and a Board of Directors (Vorstand).64
The affairs of the AG are subject to considerable formality and regula-
tion. The minimum capital requirements of the AG are relatively high.
6 5
The accounts of the AG must be audited by a certified public accountant.6 6
In light of the highly regulated nature of the AG there are only approxi-
mately 3,000 in existence in Germany.
6 7
The role of the Supervisory Board is to oversee the management board,
which is responsible for the corporation's daily affairs. The primary func-
tion of the Supervisory Board is to review management's performance.
German Supervisory Boards receive periodic reports from management,
annual reports and balance sheets. The Supervisory Board can compel
reports and has the authority to require that the Board of Directors obtain
the Supervisory Board's approval before entering into specific
transactions.68
B. The Flexible Privately-Owned German Limited Liability Company
The entity of choice for most privately-owned businesses in Germany is the
limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung or
GmbH). 69 Unlike the AG, the GmbH has a comparatively flexible manage-
ment structure. 70 The GmbH must have one or more managing directors
but generally need not create a Supervisory Board unless it is a large
employer or is engaged in specialized industries.7 ' If a Supervisory Board
64. For a thorough discussion of the public German corporation, see Hwa-Jin Kim,
Markets, Financial Institutions, and Corporate Governance: Perspectives From Germany,
26 LAw & POnY INT 'L Bus. 371 (1995) (providing a review of the German corporation
with particular emphasis on the impact which banks have on corporate governance in
Germany).
65. The incorporation of the AG requires a minimum capital of DM 100,000. Of a
total of DM 100,000, DM 25,000 must be paid by five founding members who subscribe
to the share capital. See Thomas Stohlmeier, German Limited Liability Company-Unlim-
ited Liability of Parent Company?, 21 hrr'nL Bus. LAwYim 135 (1993) (describing the Ger-
man corporate structure generally, and focusing specifically on the liability of a parent
company for the debts of a subsidiary).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 136.
68. For an excellent discussion of German corporate management, see Robert E.
Benfield, Note, Curing American Myopia: Can The German System of Corporate Govern-
ance Help?, 17 Loy. L.A. ILr'L & Comp'. LJ. 615 (1995) (analyzing the German system
with particular emphasis on the public company).
69. Id. (indicating that approximately 500,000 GmbHs are registered throughout
Germany).
70. See Henry P. De Vries & Friedrich K Juenger, Limited Liability Contract: The
GmbH, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 867 (1964) (including an excellent overview of GmbH law).
71. See Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrinkter Haftung (Act on Lim-
ited Liability Companies), § 6(1), v.10.5.1994 (BGBL I 2911), translated in 4 BUSINESS
TRaNSsAcnoNs IN GERMANY App. 6 (providing that the company shall have one or more
managing directors). See also id. § 52 (providing for specific contingencies in the event
that a Supervisory Board is appointed pursuant to the articles of association). It should
be noted that there are some circumstances in which the appointment of a Supervisory
Board is mandatory. If certain Co-Determination Acts apply, then a Supervisory Board is
required. The Co-Determination Acts require that there be employee participation at the
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is created the Supervisory Board supervises the managing directors but
does not itself engage in management activities. 72 Ultimate authority
resides in the shareholders. 73
The capitalization requirements for the GmbH are significantly less
onerous than those applicable to the AG. The GmbH must be capitalized
with at least 50,000 DM and the share capital contribution of each share-
holder must be at least 500 DM.74
The GmbH most nearly approximates the U.S. close corporation rather
than the LLC which has recently been authorized by virtually all states in
the United States. 75 In the United States, for tax purposes, most LLCs have
Supervisory Board level. Four CoDetermination Acts mandate employee participation in
a Supervisory Board including the Coal and Steel Co-Determination Act of May 21, 1951
(applicable to mining, coal and steel industries); The Supplementary Coal and Steel Co-
Determination Act of August 7, 1956 (applicable to certain holding companies in the
mining, coal and steel industries); The Co-Determination Act of May 4, 1976 (applicable
to certain legal structures which employ more than 2,000 employees); and The Shop
Constitution Act 1952 of October 11, 1952 (applicable to enterprises with certain legal
structures, including the GmbH, that employ more than 500 individuals and which cre-
ates a so-called "one-third" co-determination). See 1 BusmiNss TRaNSACIONS iN GERmA Y,
supra note 19, § 23.05(1).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrinkter Haftung (Act on Lim-
ited Liability Companies), § 5(1), v.10.5.1994 (BGBI. 12922) (F.ILG.), translated in Busi-
NESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, supra note 19, App. 6.
75. ALA. CODE 22 10-12-1 to 61 (1995); ALASKA STAT. 22 10.50.010 to .995 (Michie
1995); AIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-601 to 857 (West 1996); Arm. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-10
to -1316 (Michie 1995); CAt. CoRP. CODE 22 17000 to 17705 (West 1996); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. 22 7-80-101 to 1101 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 22 34-100 to 242
(West 1995); DL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, 22 101 to 1107 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. 22 29-1301
to 1375 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. 22 608.401 to .514 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); GA.
CODE ANN. 2H 14-11-100 to 14-11-1109 (1996); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 428-101 to
1302 (1997); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to 672 (1996); 805 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 180/1 to
180/60-1 (Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1 to 23-18-19 (Michie 1996); IowA
CODE ANN. 22 490A.100 to .1601 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. 22 17-7601 to 7652
(1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 22 275.001 to .455 (Michie 1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-
1301 to 1369 (West 1996); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 601-762 (West Supp. 1995);
MD. CODE ANN., CORnS. & Ass'Ns 22 4A-101 to 4A-1103 (1994 & Supp. 1995); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch, 156C, § 1 (Law Co-op. 1996); MICH. Comp'. LAws ANN. 22 450.4101 to
450.5200 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. 22 322.B.01 to .960 (West 1995); Miss. CODE
ANN. 22 79-29-101 to 1201 (1995); Mo. REV. STAT. 22 347.010 to 347.740 (West 1995);
MoNT. CODE ANN. 22 35-8-101 to 35-8-1307 (1995); NE. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to 2653
(1995); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. 22 86.010 to .571 (Michie 1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
22 304-C:1 to 304-C:85 (1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. 22 42:2B-1 to 70 (West 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. 22 53-19-1 to 74 (Michie 1996); N.Y. LTD. LLAB. Co. L. 22 101-1403 (McKinney
1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. 22 57C-1-01 to 57C-10-07 (1995); N.D. CENr. CODE 22 10-32-01
to 155 (1995); OHio REV. CODE ANN. 22 1705.01 to .58 (Anderson 1996); OKLA_ STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000 to 2060 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. 22 63.001 to .990 (1995); 15
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 2H 8901 to 8998 (West 1995); Il. GEN. LAWS 22 7-16-1 to-75
(1995); S.C. CODE ANN. 22 33-43-101 to 1409 (Law. Co-op 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. 22 47-34-1 to 47-34-59 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. 22 48-201-101 to 48-248-
606 (1995); TEK. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (West 1996); UTAH CODE AN n. 22 48-
2a-207 to 48-2b-158 (1994 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. 22 13.1-1000 to 1073 (Michie
1996); VT. H.B. 346 & S.B. 98, available in LEXIS, Text95 File (authorizing limited liabil-
ity companies); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 22 25.15.005 to .902 (West 1996); W. VA. CODE
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been designed to lack technically the corporate characteristic of a perpetual
life, referred to in IRS Treasury regulations as continuity of life.7 6 In con-
trast, the GmbH usually has a perpetual life unless the articles provide to
the contrary.77
C. The German Close Corporation Problem
German law provides highly discretionary judicial remedies when the
shareholder has a dispute with other GmbH shareholders. To some extent
the judicial remedies function as a source of additional regulation of share-
holder conduct. Section 61 of the GmbH law provides that: (1) The com-
pany may be dissolved by a court decision in which case it becomes
impossible to accomplish the purpose of the company or when there are
substantial causes (wichtige Grund) for the dissolution resulting from the
conditions of the company.78
Because the dissolution remedy is so severe, the German courts have
developed two additional remedies, the withdrawal (Austritt) and the
expulsion (AusschlieBung).79 Under the withdrawal concept, the aggrieved
shareholder seeks to withdraw from the company and is entitled to obtain
the fair market value of his or her interest in the company. In an expulsion,
the aggrieved shareholder seeks to expel the other shareholder or share-
holders. The right to obtain either a withdrawal or an expulsion is pre-
mised on a showing that there is a "substantial basis" or "wichtige Grund"
for the remedy.80
§§ 31-1A-1 to 31-1A-69 (Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. §§ 183.0102 to 183.1305 (1994); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to 136 (West 1996).
76. In order to obtain desired taxation as a partnership, U.S. LLCs have had to avoid
possessing more corporate than non corporate characteristics. See I.R.C. § 7701 (1997).
The four corporate characteristics are outlined in Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b) (1) to
301.7701-2(e): 1) continuity of life; 2) centralized management; 3) limited liability; and
4) free transferability of interests. In I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 IRB 7, the IRS
announced its intention to jettison the existing rules for distinguishing corporations
from partnerships. In proposed Regulations 301.7701-1, to .7701-3, the IRS gives the
taxpayer an unfettered choice of electing taxable status as a partnership or a corpora-
tion, irrespective of the business entity's tax attributes. (Published in the Federal Regis-
ter on May 13, 1996.)
77. 1 BusI.ss Tn-ausAcnONS IN GERMANY, supra note 19, § 23.09(1).
78. See Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrhnkter Haftung (Act on Lim-
ited Liability Companies) § 61(1), v.10.5.1995 (BGBI. I 2911), translated in BusINEss
TRANSACtONS IN GERMANY, supra note 19, app. 6.
79. It has been observed that the leading post-war German decision on the dissolu-
tion remedy emphasizes that dissolution leads to a loss of business and a loss of jobs.
Hence, over a seventy year period Courts have developed the withdrawal and expulsion
remedies as an alternative to the action for dissolution. See Scogin, supra note 5, at 132-
33, 152 n.101 citing BGHZ 9, 157. For an excellent explanation of the withdrawal and
exclusion, see 1 BusmEss TRANsAcnoNs IN GERMANw §§ 23.09(1), 23.09(3) n.7 (pointing
out that the leading cases on these remedies are Supreme Court of the German Reich,
decision of August 13, 1942, RGZ 169, 330; Federal Court of Justice, decisions of April
1, 1953, BGHZ 9, 157; February 5, 1955, BGHZ 16, 317; and February 23, 1981, NJW
1981, 2302 (F.R.G.).
80. Scogin, supra note 5, at 127, 154-60.
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There are three possible grounds for establishing a "substantial basis"
for a withdrawal: 1) objectionable personal characteristics of the share-
holder; 2) the arbitrary exercise of management by the shareholder; and 3)
the existence of special factors unique to the facts and circumstances. Per-
sonal circumstances of the withdrawing shareholder which may serve as a
substantial basis include extreme financial need, a lengthy and expensive
illness, relocation abroad, or the inability to perform the requisite duties.81
An analysis of the shareholder's misconduct is made if it is alleged that the
shareholder exercises majority power in an arbitrary fashion.82 Special fac-
tors can operate as a substantial basis where the shareholder's financial
return is undesirable, or where the company's purposes change and pose
additional risks to the shareholder.8 3 The articles of incorporation may
not restrict or eliminate the right to withdraw.84
If an expulsion is sought, the party seeking to expel another share-
holder may do so based on personal factors relating to the shareholder or
based on the shareholder's conduct. Advanced age, extended illness, or
mental derangement may be cited as personal factors which justify an
expulsion.85 A variety of shareholder conduct can also justify an expul-
sion. The aggrieved party may argue that the shareholder has disorganized
financial circumstances, lacks trustworthiness or creditworthiness, or has
lost personal qualifications required by the articles. An expulsion can be
sought if the shareholder has been derelict in his duties, breaches trust,
causes incurable dissension, or makes improper sexual advances.8 6 The
mechanism for expulsion is through a court order.8 7
The remedies of withdrawal and expulsion illustrate the importance of
case law in Germany. It is frequently said that common law systems rely
on case law precedents and civil law systems do not. Yet, the German close
corporation remedies are based on case law rather than statute.88
The broad scope of the definition of a "substantial basis" justifying a
withdrawal or expulsion gives rise to considerable uncertainty in share-
holder relations and operates as an added dimension of the regulation of
shareholder conduct. The GmbH shareholder must not only monitor his or
her conduct, but must also make sure that personal circumstances do not
develop which arguably could be regarded as grounds for withdrawal or
expulsion. The GmbH shareholder who also functions as a member of the
Board of Directors bears an even greater burden because the Director must
comply with a separate set of stringent standards of conduct applicable to
Board Members.89
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Scogin, supra note 5, at 133-34.
89. The standards of conduct of the Directors of the GmbH are quite strict and are
virtually identical to those applicable to the AG. The managing directors of the GmbH
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The character of the shareholder, his or her personal circumstances
and personal relationships are scrutinized by a court which is entertaining
a petition for an expulsion or withdrawal. The inquiry is not confined to
the shareholder's conduct in managing the business. For example, in a
1953 German GmbH decision involving a dispute between two owners of a
cabaret-dance bar, the defendant's extramarital affairs were relevant to a
determination of whether he should be expelled from the corporation. 90
The plaintiff sought to expel the defendant because the defendant failed to
credit the company with certain funds, and purchased a car without con-
sulting the plaintiff. In addition, the defendant had been found guilty of
adultery. In determining whether the remedy should be given, the court
evaluated the character of both parties and the defendant's adultery became
relevant to the evaluation of his character. The defendant argued that he
should be permitted to continue in the business. He maintained that his
own behavior was neutralized by the behavior of the plaintiff, because the
plaintiff had also committed adultery. The court ultimately concluded that
the plaintiff was entitled to an expulsion.
The sweeping scope of judicial discretion, and its potential for bend-
ing to serve political and/or governmental policies is illustrated by the
application of the withdrawal and expulsion remedies during the reign of
the Third Reich. During this period, Jewishness constituted a "substantial
basis" for expulsion.91 The leading case was decided in 1942.92 In 1937,
the Jewish plaintiff was expelled by the defendants and sued to obtain a
determination that his expulsion was null and void. The defendants had
taken the position that the plaintiff's Jewishness was an economic disad-
vantage and was grounds for expulsion. Although the plaintiff won in the
trial court, upon appeal the expulsion of the plaintiff was upheld. The
court reasoned that the GmbH must have the opportunity to eliminate a
partner if the character of the partner becomes intolerable. The court of
must employ the diligence of an orderly business man in the matters of the company.
See Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung (Act on Limited Lia-
bility Companies) § 43(1), v.10.5.1994 (BGBI. I 2911), translated in BusiN.iss TRausAc.
TIONS IN GsANY, supra note 19. The German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz or
AktG) requires managers and directors to apply the care of the orderly and prudent
business manager. If a Supervisory Board is used in the GmbH, the standards of care
applicable to Supervisory Board members of the AG apply to the GmbH's Supervisory
Board members. See also id. § 5 1(1). A business judgment rule may not be invoked to
shield directors from liability for their business decisions. As one commentator noted:
The burden of proof is on the directors and managers, that is, they have to show
that they have adhered to the duty of due care. The due care requirement is
absolute and any negligence, however slight, can give rise to damages. Thus, the
burden imposed on the directors is reduced by the fact that while they have
certain discretion in the exercise of their judgment, the scope of their discretion
is probably narrower than under the business judgment rule in the United
States.
See Vassil Breskovski, Directors' Duty of Care in Eastern Europe, 29 INT'L LAW. 77, 89
(1995).
90. Federal Court of Justice, decision of April 1, 1953, BGHZ 9, 157 (F.R.G.).
91. See Scogin, supra note 5, at 152 n.72.
92. Judgment of Aug. 13, 1942, RGZ 169, 334 (F.R.G.).
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appeal concluded that the plaintiffs affiliation with the Jewish race was
intolerable. 93
After World War 11 when the political climate changed, the decision
holding Jewishness as a "substantial basis" was condemned and the expul-
sion remedy became controversial.94 However, in 1953 the Court upheld
the expulsion remedy. 95 Although Jewishness is no longer grounds for
expulsion, the courts continue to award expulsions based on the rationale
that a shareholder should not be trapped in an unbearable commercial
relationship.
The close corporation remedies under German law are clearly
broader than those found in most states in the United States. In contrast to
the German remedies of withdrawal and expulsion, equitable remedies
under U.S. law are typically, although not exclusively geared to alleviating
the problems of the minority shareholder. 96 U.S. remedies focus rather
narrowly on the shareholder's conduct in the business, rather than on the
shareholder's overall character. Finally, while U.S. partnership law pro-
vides a mechanism for the expulsion of a partner,97 shareholder expulsion
has not been adopted as a remedy in the U.S. corporate context.
D. The Public and Private Company Under UK Law
The corporate organizational forms in the United Kingdom differ signffi-
candy from their German counterpart. 98 The most widely used corporate
form for commercial enterprise in the UK is the Registered Company. The
three types of Registered Company include: 1) the company "limited by
shares"; 2) the company "limited by Guarantee"; and 3) the "unlimited
company."99 The company which is "limited by shares" may be publicly or
93. Id.
94. Scogin, supra note 5, at 142.
95. See Judgment of Apr. 1, 1953, BGHZ 9, 157 (F.R.G.).
96. Some decisions have addressed the problem of tyranny on the part of the minor-
ity shareholder. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc. 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1981) (involving minority shareholders who caused the company to incur an accu-
mulated earnings tax because of a failure to declare dividends). For a recent critique of
remedies for minority shareholders, see Jeffrey M. McFarland, Florida Corporation Law:
Proposed Statutory Relief For Oppressed Minority Shareholders in Florida, 46 FLA. L REv.
149 (1994) (providing an analysis of Florida close corporation provisions). See also
HunterJ. Brownlee, The Shareholders'Agreement: A Contractual Alternative To Oppression
As A Ground For Dissolution, 24 SMSON L REv. 267 (1994) (providing an overview of
majority shareholder oppression and recommending a contractual solution to the close
corporation problem); Chernichaw, supra note 12, at 501 (reviewing close corporation
legislation, and analyzing its under-utilization).
97. See UNIF. PARrmsNaip Act (1994) § 601, 6 U.LA. 72 (1994) (providing in part
that a partner is dissociated from a firm upon the partner's expulsion by unanimous
vote of the other partners in a number of circumstances).
98. See DOING BusNEss IN THE UNrED KINGDOM 18.01-.05 (1996).
99. The Companies Act, 1985, ch. 1, § 1(2), provides that
A company so formed may be either-
a) a company having the liability of its members limited by the memorandum
to the amount, if any unpaid on the shares respectively held by them ("a com-
pany limited by shares");
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privately owned.100 The liability of its shareholders is limited to the share-
holders' capital contributions. 1 1 In contrast, the company "limited by
guarantee" is used typically for charitable or non-profit-making pur-
poses. 10 2 The liability of shareholders in a "limited by guarantee" com-
pany is specified in the company's memorandum.' 0 3 The memorandum
obligates the shareholders to pay a specific amount upon the winding up of
the company. Finally, the shareholders of the unlimited company have
personal liability. In practice there are few such companies because of the
significant potential exposure to legal liability.
Private companies in the UK may be operated with less formality and
expense than public companies. 10 4 A public company may not conduct
business unless the registrar of companies has issued an appropriate certif-
icate.'0 5 Public companies must be capitalized with a minimum of 50,000
pounds while private companies are subject to no minimum capital
b) a company having the liability of its members limited by the memorandum
to such amount as the members may respectively thereby undertake to con-
tribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being wound up ("a
company limited by guarantee"); or
c) a company not having any limit on the liability of its members ("an unlim-
ited company").
Section 3(1) further provides in part:
(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 1 and 2, the form of the memorandum
of association of-
a) a public company, being a company limited by shares,
b) a public company, being a company limited by guarantee and having a
share capital,
c) a private company limited by shares,
d) a private company limited by guarantee and not having a share capital,
e) a private company limited by guarantee and having a share capital, and
I) an unlimited company having a share capital, shall be specified respectively
for such companies by regulations made by the Secretary of State, or as near
to that form as circumstances admit.
Id.
100. Id. ch. I, § 1(3). Section 1(3) defines a public company as:
[A] company limited by shares or limited by guarantee and having a share capi-
tal, being a company-
a) the memorandum of which states that it is to be a public company, and
b) in relation to which the provision of this Act or the former Companies Acts
as to the registration or registration of a company as a public company have
been complied with on or after December 22, 1980;
and a "private company" is a company that is not a public company.
Id.
101. Id. § 1(2)(b).
102. DOING BusirE.ss IN THE UNrrm KINGDOM, supra note 98, § 18.02 (providing an
excellent commentary on the different types of companies in the UK).
103. Id.
104. M. Freeman Durham, Comment, The Companies Act, 1980: Its Effects on British
Corporate Law, 4 Nw.J. ILr'L L. & Bus. 551, 553 (1982) (outlining the major changes in
the corporate law of Great Britain following the introduction of rules regarding director
conflicts of interest, special rules regarding insider trading, and revised remedies for
minority shareholders).
105. Companies Act, 1985, ch. I, § 117(1) (requiring public companies to obtain cer-
tificate prior to conducting business). See also Durham, supra note 93, at 553 n.19.
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requirements.10 6 Public companies must have at least two directors
whereas private companies may have only one director. 10 7 Further,
although all companies must have an auditor, private companies are sub-
ject to fewer accounting requirements and are not required to file interim
financial reports. 08
Unlike the German AG, or the French socidtt anonyme (SA), public and
private UK companies have a single-tier management structure. The UK
company is managed by a Board of Directors and does not possess a Super-
visory Board. Generally, public companies must have at least two directors
and private companies must have one director. 10 9 All companies must
also have a Secretary and Auditors." 0
E. The UK Close Corporation Problem
Because the shareholder of a private UK company may not freely transfer
his or her corporate interest, the shareholder of a private company is vul-
nerable in the event of a dispute with other shareholders. The minority
shareholder is particularly at risk where there is misconduct by the major-
ity owner. Disagreements among shareholders can bring corporate opera-
tions to a grinding halt.
Historically, the shareholder of a company has been prevented from
obtaining court involvement in company affairs by the doctrine of Foss v.
Harbottle."' This 1843 decision states that in the case of a wrong done to
the company, the company is the proper plaintiff, and where a wrong
could be ratified by a majority of shareholders, no individual member
could bring an action.112 However, a major statutory exception to the rule
of Foss v. Harbottle was enacted in The Companies Act of 1948.113 Under
106. See Companies Act, 1985, ch. I, §§ 11, 11& (providing for minimum authorized
capital in the case of public entities).
107. Id. ch. II, § 282 (providing that "[e]very company registered on or after 1st
November 1929 (other than a private company) shall have at least two directors [and]
[e]very private company shall have at least one director"). Companies registered before
November 1, 1929 (other than private companies) are required to have only one direc-
tor. Id.
108. Id. ch. II, § 272, sets forth the statutory requirements with regard to interim
accounts for public companies. Section 384 imposes the duty to have an auditor on all
companies. Id. ch. V, §§ 3, 4.
109. Id. ch. II, § 282.
110. Id. ch. II, § 283(1). See also id. ch. V, § 384 (providing in part that every com-
pany shall appoint an auditor or auditors). See also DOING BusiNESS IN THE UNrrEDI KING-
DOM, supra note 98, § 18.03 (indicating that every registered company must have
directors, a secretary, and an auditor, all of whom have statutory duties).
111. 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (V.C. 1843).
112. A.J. Boyle, Directors Fiduciary Duties: The Continuing Problem of Effective Enforce-
ment, FORUM INTERNATIONALE (Oct. 1986) (providing that the rule in Foss v. Harbottle
does not extend to a case where the act complained of is either illegal or ultra vires, or is
a fraud upon the minority, and where there is unfair and oppressive conduct against the
minority).
113. ROBERT R. PENNINGTON, DiREcroRs' PERSONAL LimBnrr 228 (1987) (observing
that the Companies Act of 1948 provided a remedy for oppressive conduct on the part of
majority shareholders. Previously the court had power to order a winding up of the
company as a remedy to minority owners based on earlier Companies Acts dating back
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the 1948 Act, the minority shareholder could petition the court for an equi-
table remedy if it could be established that the affairs of the company were
being conducted in an "oppressive" manner.1 1 4 The court was empowered
to fashion its own remedy with a view to bringing the objectionable con-
duct to an end.115
Under the 1948 law, the ordinary dictionary definition of oppressive
conduct was employed and required proof of the occurrence of "burden-
some, harsh and wrongful conduct."" 6 In the seminal case Scottish Co-
operative Society Ltd. v. Meyer" 7 oppression was regarded as taking vari-
ous forms and consisted of conduct indicating a lack of probity and fair
dealing in the affairs of the company." 8 Thus, the English approach to
providing remedies to shareholders of the dose corporation differs funda-
mentally from its German counterpart. Under German law, expulsion or
withdrawal from a private company could be obtained where the individual
characteristics of a fellow shareholder provided substantial causes, whereas
under UK law, an equitable remedy may be provided if it can be shown
that conduct of the company's affairs has been improper. The German law
focuses on the shareholders' personal relationship, whereas the UK law
focuses on conduct of the business.
Although the 1948 remedy was intended as a remedial measure for
minority shareholders, it was applied in a highly restrictive manner. In the
history of the statute only two petitioners were ever granted the remedy." 9
In 1962 the Jenkins Committee reviewed the law and recommended that
the provision be revised to become more accessible. 120
to the Companies Act 1862 § 79(5)). Courts had statutory power to order the winding
up of a company because it was just and equitable to do so in view of the subjection of
minority shareholders to extended or persistent oppressive treatment by the persons
who controlled the company.
114. Id.
115. Id. See also Re Saul D. Harrison & Sons [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 18 (C.A. Eng.)(observing that "[e]nabling the court in an appropriate case to outflank the rule in Foss
v. Harbottle was one of the purposes of the section").
116. Ralph Instone, Unfairly Prejudiced Directors, 136 NEw LJ. 973 (1986) (indicating
that Viscount Simonds in Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc. Ltd. v. Meyer [1958] 3 All E.R.
66, 71, employed the ordinary dictionary meaning of oppressive conduct).
117. [1958] 3 All E.R. 66 (involving a suit by the minority against the majority who
had adopted a policy of starving the company of supplies of rayon cloth for its manufac-
turing process).
118. Id.
119. See Re Harmer 1 W.L.R. 62 (C.A. 1959) (Eng.) (involving a father who ran the
affairs of the company in a dictatorial manner in disregard of his sons' wishes); Scottish
Co-op. Wholesale Soc. Ltd., 3 All E.R. at 66 (involving a company whose business was
diverted to another company). See also Instone, supra note 104, at 973 (pointing out that
unfair removal from the board of directors did not constitute a ground for relief under
the 1948 Companies Act, citing Elder v. Elder & Watson Ltd., (1952) SC 49, because
only a member of the company (not a director) could obtain the remedy).
120. See Minority Shareholders: What Protection, If Any, Does English Law Give to
Minority Shareholders?, EsTATE GAzETTr, July 27, 1991, at 154, 155 (reviewing the his-
tory of the remedies for minority shareholders) [hereinafter Minority Shareholders].
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A new provision was inserted into the 1980 Companies Act to provide
assistance to the minority shareholder. The new formulation, now found
in Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 provides:
A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order
under this Part on the ground that the company's affairs are being or have
been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of
some part of the members (including at least himself) or that any actual or
proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on
its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial. 12 '
Section 46 1(1) provides the court with wide discretion to award a rem-
edy.122 If the court is satisfied that a petition is justified the court may
fashion a remedy in any number of ways including, but not limited to: 1)
issuing an order regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in the
future; 2) requiring the company to refrain from certain conduct; 3) order-
ing civil proceedings; and 4) ordering one or more members to purchase
the shares of other members.' 23
The intent of the change was to provide a more comprehensive remedy
to minority shareholders and to broaden the circumstances under which
relief would be granted.124 The revised provisions have now opened up a
floodgate of litigation and the new rules have been widely criticized for
producing lengthy and costly litigation.
Unfairly prejudicial conduct has been asserted in a wide variety of
circumstances. Unfairly prejudicial conduct has been alleged where: 1)
one member prevents another from participating in the management of the
company;1' 2) one member has seriously mismanaged a business;126 3) a
member improperly uses corporate assets;' 27 4) one member misappropri-
121. See Companies Act 1985, pt. XVII, § 459(1).,
122. Id. § 461(1).
123. Id. § 461(2).
124. See Minority Shareholders?, supra note 120, at 154 (providing an overview of the
remedies for minority shareholders under UK law).
125. Re Haden Bill Electrical Ltd. [1995] 2 BCLC 280 (Ch. Eng.) (holding that a plain-
tiff who was removed as chairman and as director of a private company had a legitimate
expectation that he would continue to participate in the management of the company);
Re Bird Precision Bellows, Ltd. [1985] 3 All E.R. 523 (C.A.) (holding that unfair preju-
dice existed where the petitioner were minority shareholders and the majority removed
them from the board of directors).
126. Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354 (Ch. Eng.) (substantial mismanage-
ment of the real estate business occurred where the defendant failed to get competitive
bids on construction work, failed to refurbish properties, failed to properly supervise
repair work, obtained poor terms for leases, mismanaged litigation, and overpaid
insurance).
127. See Re Elgindata Ltd. [1993] 1 All E.R. 232 (C.A.) (holding that serious misman-
agement occurred where majority shareholders bought an expensive car, had company
pay for construction costs of a home, and used corporate assets for personal purposes).
See also In re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd. [1990] Ch. 682, [19891 3 W.L.R. 923 [1990]
B.C.L.C. 80 (Eng.) (involving a director who had the company purchase a holiday home
for his sons, and refused to pay dividends).
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ates sums of the company's money;128 and 5) a member diverts substantial
profits from the company to himself.129
The judicial construction of the definition of unfairly prejudicial con-
duct has been purposely vague. As noted in Burr v. Harrison :130
'Unfairly prejudicial' is deliberately imprecise language which was chosen
by Parliament because its earlier attempt in s 210 of the Companies Act
1948 to provide a similar remedy had been too restrictively construed ...
[i]n deciding what is fair or unfair for the purposes of s 459, it is important
to have in mind that fairness is being used in the context of a commercial
relationship. 131
Recently in the UK, as in the United States, the British courts have
looked to the legitimate expectations of the shareholder to define unfairly
prejudicial conduct. 132 Under the legitimate expectations analysis, the
court may look beyond the intentions of the parties as reflected in the arti-
cles of incorporation. 133 The court will attempt to discern the fundamen-
tal understanding of the parties as to the nature of their relationship and
the conduct of the business. 134 Thus, the court may conclude that part of
128. Adam Wilson Young and Others v. Falkirk Football and Athletic Club Ltd. Outer
House Cases (involving allegations of improper personal expenditures, incompetent
management causing loss of goodwill, and misappropriation of funds).
129. Lowe v. Fahey and others [1996] 1 BCLC 262 ((Ch. Eng.) (alleging that substan-
tial profits from two development projects were diverted from the company). See also In
Re London School of Electronics Ltd. [1986] 1 Ch 211, [1985] 3 WLR 474, [1985]
BCLC 273, [1983-85] BCC, 394 (Ch. Eng.) (involving a diversion of the company's stu-
dents from the company's program to a different program).
130. Re Saul D. Harrison & Sons [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17 (C.A. Eng.).
131. Id.
132. Re Postgate & Derby (Agencies) Ltd. [1987] BCLC 8, [1986] BCC 99, 353 (Ch.
Eng.) in which the court reviewed a management buy-out which was in which the direc-
tors had an interest. In articulating the legal standard required under Section 459 of the
Companies Act 1985 the court explained: "The concept of unfair prejudice which forms
the basis of the jurisdiction under S 459 enables the court to take into account not only
the rights of members under the company's constitution, but also their legitimate expec-
tations arising from the agreements or understandings of the members inter se." Id.
133. See O'NEA- & THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 9.30 (discussing the analysis of the
minority's reasonable expectations to determine whether the majority has acted in an
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial manner).
134. See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co. 400 A.2d 554, 561-62 (NJ. Super.
1979), affd, 414 A.2d 994 (NJ. 1980) (employing an analysis of the plaintiffs reason-
able expectations and concluding that the plaintiffs reasonable expectations were not
defeated in light of the fact that the plaintiff had not gotten along with others, had not
learned the restaurant business, and had quit on more than one occasion). See also In re
Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984) (involving two minority sharehold-
ers of a table linen manufacturer who sought judicial dissolution on the grounds that
the conduct of the majority was fraudulent and oppressive). The petitioners argued that
they had been frozen out of the company. Id. at 1176. The court emphasizes that the
defeat of the complaining member's reasonable expectations constitutes shareholder
oppression. Id. at 1178, 1180. The court adopts a case-buy-case approach. Several
cases decided after Kemp have employed the reasonable expectation standard. See In re
Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
(indicating that mere disappointment in the results of a venture is not sufficient to jus-
tify dissolution); In re Matter of Blake, 486 N.Y.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (involving
a dispute regarding the valuation of stock); In re Dubonnet Scarfs, Inc., 484 N.Y.S.2d
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541, 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (involving a shareholder whose financial difficulties
could not justify his demand to be bought out); Gunzberg v. Art Lloyd Metal Prod.
Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85-86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (indicating that a shareholder who
has a long history of being active in the business has reasonable expectations of contin-
ued employment and input into management, and even if there were sound business
reasons for some of the corporation's actions the ultimate beneficiary was the majority);
In re Mintz (Astoria Holding Corp.), 493 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (not-
ing that a determination of oppressive conduct can only be based on a determination of
the full development of the facts and opportunity for discovery); In re Levitt, 492
N.Y.S.2d 736, 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (noting that an inactive shareholder's interest is
in receiving the fair market value of shares and any other result could enable the share-
holder to use dissolution as a coercive tool); Landorf v. Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494,
497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (observing that a minority shareholder's basic interest in the
business is in active control of the business rather than passive investment in an enter-
prise conducted by others). See also Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987)
(involving a suit for dissolution by minority shareholder who was fired form his posi-
tion); Petraglia v. Whirlwind Music Distrib., Inc., 511 N.Y.S.2d 718 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987) (alleging that the majority diverted business from the corporation and refused to
pay dividends and consequently pleading facts constituting oppressive conduct); In re
Imperatore, 512 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (indicating that the share-
holder who purchased a minority interest with the understanding he would be a salaried
employee could reasonably expect employment to continue as long as the corporation
continues); In re Farega Realty Corp., 517 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (indi-
cating laxness in maintaining records, failure to regularly consult petitioner and denial
of access to records was not oppressive against a minority shareholder who was a pas-
sive investor); In re Brach, 522 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (involving situa-
tion where petitioner merely made allegations of dissatisfaction with management
which would not support a finding of oppressive conduct); In re Musilli, 523 N.Y.S.2d
120, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (involving inactive minority shareholder whose legiti-
mate goal should be in securing the fair market value of the interest); Burack v. I.
Burack, Inc., 524 N.Y.S.2d 457, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (indicating the doctrine of
unclean hands is not an automatic bar to recovery but shareholder's acts made in bad
faith and undertaken with a view toward involuntary dissolution will bar dissolution); In
re Mitchell, 529 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (indicating a suit for dissolution
should proceed to trial and not to a private referee); In re Pace Photographers, Ltd., 530
N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that a shareholder's agreement providing for the sale
of stock was not relevant in an action for dissolution of the corporation by a minority
shareholder); In re Smith, 546 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (indicating that
after acquiescence in majority's exercise of control of day-to-day operation disappoint-
ment in not being voted onto board of directors should not be equated with oppression,
nor should failure to pay dividends in the absence of a policy to pay dividends); In re
Schlacter, 546 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (indicating that spouse of termi-
nated employee at will could not reasonably expect ancillary benefits of spouse's contin-
ued employment); Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. App. 1990) (plaintiff was
awarded compensation for lost wages which he reasonably expected to earn as an
employee and stockholder of the company); In re Alleman, 574 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991) (involving a minority shareholder claim for oppression arising out of a pro-
posed merger); In re Century 21 Metalios Rental Real Estate, Inc., 587 N.Y.S.2d 215
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that because of a shareholder's agreement the minority
shareholder may be entitled to a remedy other than dissolution); Gee v. Blue Stone
Heights Hunting Club, Inc., 604 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1992) (indicating that
oppressive actions refer to conduct that substantially defeats the reasonable expecta-
tions of the shareholder); Michaud v. Morris, 603 So.2d 886 (Ala. 1992) (defeated legiti-
mate expectations alone do not always show there has been oppressive conduct); In re
Application by Bon Neuve Realty Corp., 601 N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (alleg-
ing that the minority was denied participation in the company); Smith v. Leonard, 876
S.W.2d 266 (Ark 1994) (alleging breach of fiduciary duty and violation of minority
shareholders' expectations where one of the shareholders obtained majority control of
Cornell International Law Journal
the unwritten, but fundamental understanding between the parties is that
they will both participate in management, receive dividends, or conduct
business in a certain manner. Violations of this fundamental understand-
ing may be regarded as unfairly prejudicial conduct.
While the law was revised with the best of intentions to provide
aggrieved shareholders with fair access to a remedy, the new provision has
lead to an overwhelming amount of lengthy and costly litigation. The deft-
nition of "unfairly prejudicial" must be decided on a case by case basis and
has created a considerable degree of uncertainty involving the resolution of
shareholder disputes. 135 The UK Law Commission is currently studying
the provision and is expected to develop recommendations for improve-
ment in the law.
F. The Public and Private Company Under French Law
The two primary business entities in France are the public corporation or
societe anonyme (SA) 136 and the private corporation or the socidtd d respon-
sabilite limitee (SARL). 137 The SA is subject to a wide variety of formal
rules regarding governance, while the SARL is operated with fewer formali-
ties and is the entity of choice for the small or medium-sized business.
Overall, the French public corporate scheme more closely resembles
the law governing public corporations in Germany than in the UK. Indeed,
the French and German structures have similar approaches to employee
participation in management and in standards of conduct of directors.
However, under the French scheme, the founders of the company may
choose between a one-tier or two-tier management structure.
Under the one-tiered approach, the management consists of the Board
of Directors or conseil d'administration and the principal officer or president
the corporation by acquiring another shareholder's stock in the company. The addi-
tional stock was acquired from a shareholder who had embezzled funds belonging to the
corporation. The minority maintained that they were not informed of the plan to recover
embezzled funds); In re O'Neill, 626 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (involving a
minority shareholder who had been frozen out of the corporation after having been
convicted of conspiring to import controlled substances); Bauer v. Bauer, No. A/67179,
1996 Cal. App. LEXIS 584 (1996) (holding that the term "persistent unfairness" as used
in the California statute to justify judicial dissolution is not defined by the "reasonable
expectations" of the minority shareholder).
135. See J.C. Bruno, "Reasonable Expectations"-A Primer on an Oppressive Standard,
71 MIcH BJ. 434 (1992) (Part 1); 71 MIcH BJ. 566 (1992) (Part 2) (discussing the uncer-
tainty in the law created by the use of the reasonable expectation standard).
136. See Law No. 66-537 ofJuly 24, 1966, reprinted in C. COM., app. (90th ed., Petits
Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.); Decree No. 67-236 of March 23, 1967, reprinted in C. CoM.
app. VIII (65th ed., Petits Codes Dalloz 1969) (Fr.). See also Law No. 78-9 ofJanuary 4,
1978, reprinted in C. COM., app. VII (74th ed., Petits Codes Dalloz 1978) (Fr.).
137. See CODE C1,n. [C. civ.] art. 1832(12) (95th ed., Petits Codes Dalloz 1995) (Fr.);
Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, arts. 36, 1(2). See 1 SIMPON & Assoc. Er AL.., DOING
BUSINESS IN FRANCE § 5.01, at 5-12 (1996) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE]. Busi-
ness entities in France other than the public and private companies include the socigte en
nom collectif, a general partnership, and two types of limited partnerships referred to as
the socidt6 en commandite simple and the soci6te en commandite par actions. See id.
§§ 5.05[1], at 5-117, and 5.05[2], at 5-128.1 (providing an excellent overview of com-
mercial law in France).
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du conseil d'administration.138 Under the two-tiered approach, the com-
pany is operated by a Directorate which manages the business, and by a
Supervisory Board or conseil de surveillance which supervises the Director-
ate.139 While both structures are subject to numerous formalities, most
companies select the unitary form since it is somewhat less restrictive.1 40
In the case of the two-tier public enterprise, the primary purpose of
the Supervisory Board is to control the management of the corporation.
The Supervisory Board is a management watch-dog of sorts, somewhat
resembling the audit committee found increasingly in large U.S. public
companies.' 4 '
The management structure of the SARL is simpler than that of the SA.
The SARL may consist of two to fifty managing directors or gerants. 142 The
managing directors need not be shareholders as is the case with the SA's
Board of Directors.' 43
All SAs and all large SARLs must have statutory auditors. 44 The
French SA must have at least one statutory auditor.' 45 The purpose of the
statutory auditor is to ensure that the corporation complies with applicable
138. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, arts. 89, 117. See also 1 DOING BUSINESS IN
FRANCE, supra note 137, § 5.05[21, at 5-24 (reviewing the SA management structure).
139. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, arts. 118, 150. See also 1 DOING BusINESS IN
FRANCE, supra note 137, § 5.05[21, at 5-24 (discussing the two-tiered management
structure).
140. Breskovski, supra note 89, at 91 (indicating that while both the one- and two-
tiered structures are available in France, most of the societds anonymes are organized
under a unitary structure). Even if the one-tier structure is selected, the corporation
must conform to significant formalities. Each member of the Board of Directors must be
a shareholder. Law No. 66-537 ofJuly 24, 1966, art. 95(3). See also 1 DOING BuSINESS IN
FRANCE, supra note 137, § 5.05[2], at 5-24. Absent a provision specifying the Directors'
age limits, no more than one-third of the Directors may be older than age seventy. Law
No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 90-1. See also 1 DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE, supra note
137, § 5.05[2], at 5-25.
141. See PNMCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANcE § 3A02 (1994). The A.LL Corporate
Governance Project recommends that every large publicly-held corporation have an
audit committee. The purpose of the committee is to implement and to support the
oversight function of the board by reviewing the corporation's processes for producing
financial information, its internal controls, and the independence of its auditors. See
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOvERNANCE § 5.04. at 234 (1995) (indicating that the
widespread use of the audit committee in the U.S. followed when the New York Stock
Exchange in the late 1970's required that every corporation listed on the Exchange have
an audit committee). Subsequently, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
required disclosure of the number of audit committee meetings. Id. In 1978, the Corpo-
rate Director's Guidebook strongly recommended installation of an audit committee. Id.
142. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 49(1). See also 1 DOING BUSINESS IN
FRANCE, supra note 137, § 5.03[2], at 5-105. If there is only one member, the business is
conducted in the form of a EURL.
143. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 49(2). See also 1 DOING BUsINEss IN
FRANCE, supra note 137, § 5.03[2], at 5-105.
144. The SARL requires a statutory auditor if it meets two of the following three crite-
ria: 1) the sum of the net values of the SARL's assets is greater than 10 million Francs;
2) the SARL has a turnover greater than 20 million Francs, or 3) the SARL employed an
average of greater than fifty employees during the fiscal year. See Law No. 66-537 ofJuly
24, 1966, art. 64(2); Decree No. 67-236 of March 23, 1967, arts. 43, 12(1), 51(2). See
also 1 DOING BUsINEss IN FRANCE, supra note 137, § 5.03[2], at 5-109.
145. See I DOING BUsINsS IN FRANCE, supra note 137, § 5.0212], at 5-34.
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corporate law and to certify the fairness and accuracy of the financial state-
ments. The scope of the statutory auditor's responsibility is broad.- 46 The
statutory auditor must verify the accuracy of the financial statements, and
ensure that the business is complying with the law.147
G. The French Close Corporation Problem
The owners of a SARL face the same potential problems faced by investors
who own shares in an illiquid private corporation. If the owners have a
dispute, the company may be deadlocked, or one or more members may be
squeezed out of the business enterprise. Dissolution is a remedy available
to shareholders of the SARL who have irreconcilable grievances with one
another. The company law provides for anticipatory dissolution of the
company by tribunal upon demand of one of the members, where there
are: "valid reasons, especially in the event of nonperformance of obliga-
tions by one of the members, or of discord among the members paralyzing
the operation of the company."' 48
Unfortunately, the statute provides no guidance as to the definition of
"valid reasons" and there is virtually no case law to elaborate on the con-
cept. Further, the remedy provided under French law is more severe than
that provided under German or UK law. The French remedy is dissolu-
tion-a dramatic measure that extinguishes the corporation. In contrast,
the German remedies of expulsion or withdrawal change the composition
of shareholders, but leave the business entity intact. Similarly, the UK rem-
edies for unfairly prejudicial conduct may include but are not limited to
146. See 1 DOING BusrnqEss IN FRAN cE, supra note 137, § 5.03[2], at 5-35.
The role assigned to the Statutory Auditor is far more supervisory than the role
of the certified public accountant of an American corporation: the Statutory
Auditor, for example, is called upon not to prepare the financial statements of
the corporation, a task handled by management, but rather to verify the accu-
racy thereof and, in addition, to ensure the proper functioning of the corpora-
tion and the equal treatment of the shareholders.Id.
147. Id.
148. See Law No. 78-9 of January 4, 1978, art. 1844-7, providing:
The company terminates:
1. Upon expiration of the time for which it was established, except where it
has been extended in accordance with article 1844-6;
2. Upon accomplishment or extinguishment of its object;
3. Upon annulment of the company contract;
4. Upon anticipatory dissolution (dissolution anticipate) agreed to by the
members;
5. Upon anticipatory dissolution pronounced by the tribunal upon demand
of one of the members for valid reasons (justes motifs), especially in the event
of nonperformance of his obligations by one of the members, or of discord
among the members paralyzing the operation of the company;
6. Upon anticipatory dissolution pronounced by the tribunal in the case spec-
ified in article 1844-5;
7. (Law No. 88-15 of Jan. 5, 1988.) By the effect of a judgment ordering the
judicial liquidation or the complete transfer of the assets of the company;
8. For any other cause specified in the statutes. It should be noted that these
provisions apply to the SA and the SARL.
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dissolution of the corporation. Under UK law, equitable solutions far short
of dissolution may be fashioned, such as shareholder buy-outs.
The only other remedy available under French law short of anticipa-
tory dissolution, is an order for the majority to prepare reports on specific
matters of concern to the minority shareholders. The French law provides
that ten percent of the shareholders may obtain an order from the Com-
mercial Court to appoint an expert to prepare a report on one or more
issues which concern the corporation.' 49 Upon completion of the report it
must be sent to the petitioning shareholder, the corporation's statutory
auditor, and if appropriate, the public prosecutor. The report must be pub-
lished along with the annual report or notice to shareholders of the next
annual meeting.1 50
III. The Burdens and Benefits of Judicial Discretion in Resolving
Close Corporation Shareholder Disputes
A review of private corporate structures and remedies for shareholder dis-
putes in Germany, the UK, and France reveals considerable diversity in
company laws. A comparative review reveals the highly discretionary
nature of the law governing private shareholder remedies in each country,
and the potential that vaguely-worded legal standards might increase
rather than reduce uncertainty and confusion as the appropriate standard
of shareholder conduct.
Without statutory guidance regarding shareholder conduct, both the
minority and the majority shareholder face the potential of the arbitrary
exercise of judicial discretion. Arbitrary judicial decision-making may
assume many forms-religious prejudice is just one example. The enact-
ment of statutory guidance to govern judicial decision-making would tend
to increase the predictability of the law and would foster accountability on
the part of the judiciary.
A. Amorphous Legal Concepts Surrounding Shareholder Conduct May
Create a Potential for Abuse
In Germany, judicial discretion is perhaps the broadest where an expulsion
or withdrawal may be obtained if there is a "substantial basis."15 The
German experience with expulsions during the reign of the Third Reich
illustrates the potential destructive force of vague legal concepts coupled
with broad judicial discretion.' 5 2 Under German law today, the breadth of
judicial discretion remains significant insofar as the shareholders' contrac-
149. See 1 DoING BusINEss IN FRANcez, supra note 137, § 5.02[3], at 5-50.
150. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 226. See David J. Berger, Guidelines For
Mergers and Acquisitions in France, 11 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 484,493 (1991) (discussing
the major provisions of the SA).
151. Supra note 78.
152. See Scogin, supra note 5, at 181 ("In evaluating alternative approaches, such as
that of Germany, one must ask whether the amelioration of this problem (private com-
pany shareholder dissension) is worth the danger of abuse inherent in relying upon
vague concepts coupled with considerable judicial discretion.").
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tual agreement and business relationship do not provide a limited frame-
work in which shareholder conduct may be evaluated. The judicial inquiry
goes far beyond the commercial relationship of the parties and extends to
the shareholder's personal relationships and personal characteristics.15 3
The French approach to the problem also creates the potential for unbri-
dled judicial discretion. "Valid reasons" may trigger a dissolution in
France, but no definition whatsoever is provided for the term "valid
reasons."
154
In the UK, the shareholder's contractual agreement and conduct in the
course of managing the business provides the framework for analyzing
whether the defendant's conduct was "unfairly prejudicial." Since purely
personal factors are not taken into account in assessing whether conduct is
"unfairly prejudicial" the UK law provides less opportunity for judicial dis-
cretion than the German law and the French law. Nevertheless, the deter-
mination of unfairly prejudicial conduct is frequently made based on a
determination of whether the shareholder's reasonable expectations were
defeated.' 55 A case-by-case analysis of reasonable expectations creates
considerable uncertainty in the application of the law.156
B. Vague Standards for Shareholder Conduct May Compound
Confusion Among International Investors
The socializing effect of the law has long been widely recognized.' 5 7 To a
very real extent, shareholder remedies for misconduct either explicitly or
implicitly provide standards of appropriate conduct for shareholders. The
law's socializing and standard-setting objectives are undermined when the
law is excessively vague. Vague legal standards may compound the confu-
sion already experienced by shareholders from different cultures.' 58 A
German and UK shareholder may operate on entirely different assump-
tions regarding acceptable shareholder conduct. The vague laws providing
remedies for shareholder misconduct do nothing to dispel cultural
153. See supra Part II.
154. See supra note 148.
155. See O'NEA. & THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 9.02.
156. See Sandra K Miller, A Note on the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority
Shareholders: How Can the Reasonable Expectation Standard Be Reasonably Applied in
Pennsylvania, 12J.L. & Comm. 51 (1992) (providing a critique of the reasonable expecta-
tion test for determining oppressive conduct).
157. See John C. Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay On Steering
Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 789, 792-93 (1984). Professor
Coffee emphasizes the educational and socializing effects of the law. He indicates that
"[tihis reductionist approach ignores the important educational and aspirational role
that the law... [has] long played in our society in setting standards." See also Thomas
C. Lee, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b) (7) and The Ero-
sion of The Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 239, 266 (1987) (emphasizing that
the socializing effect of the law should not be overlooked).
158. See RobertJ. Walters, "Now That I Ate the Sushi, Do We Have A Deal?"-The Law-
yer as Negotiator in Japanese-U.S. Business Transactions, 12 Nw. J. ITr'L L. & Bus. 335
(1991) (emphasizing the dramatic impact which cultural differences have on the law).
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confusion.' 59
As already indicated, a withdrawal or expulsion under German law
does not require an element of fault, nor is it limited to conduct which
takes place in the conduct of the business. Personal characteristics or per-
sonal circumstances of one's partner generally may be grounds for the
expulsion or withdrawal. In contrast, the UK law looks strictly to the actual
conduct of the business enterprise at issue.1 60 A showing of a breach of fidu-
ciary duty, disloyalty, self-dealing, or bad faith in the operation of the busi-
ness is typically required. A UK shareholder who jointly owns and
operates a business in Germany with a German shareholder may be sur-
prised to find that his or her personal conduct, outside of his business
conduct may be significant to his German co-investor. Yet, as noted by the
German Court in 1953:
Even though the statute does not contain any equivalent regulation, it is
possible that one partner can be expelled, if there has been significant rea-
sons regarding his character. The exclusion takes place by a juridicial ver-
dict ... In any case in a company which consists of two partners in a
personified company GmbH, the behavior and the character of the partner
who continues the company by himself has to be examined. 16 1
It is unlikely that a UK or American shareholder would anticipate that
one's personal relationship with his or her spouse would be relevant to
litigation with a co-investor as it was in one 1953 German case decision
involving owners of a cabaret club. 16 2 The UK business person is likely to
make a distinction between business life and personal life. One is unlikely
to assume that decisions affecting one's personal life will affect or be rele-
vant to one's business life. Yet, this dichotomy between personal and busi-
ness affairs may not be present in the mind of a business partner from a
different culture.
The cultural distinction between the personal and business sphere is
reflected in the UK law in a recent Chancery Division opinion regarding a
suit for unfairly prejudicial shareholder conduct. The UK court empha-
sized that the conduct under scrutiny was conduct occurring in the conduct
of the company's affairs 163 noting:
... it befits the court, in my view, to be extremely careful to ensure that
oppression is not caused to parties, respondents to such petitioners or,
indeed, petitioners upon such petitioners, by allowing the parties to trawl
159. To gain an appreciation for the diversity in corporate law among countries, see
Eduardo Recio, Shareholders' Rights in Japan, 10 UCLA PAc. BASIN Li. 489 (1992) (dis-
cussing the differences in shareholders' rights between the U.S. and Japan).
160. The actual UK statute looks to whether the companies affairs "are being or have
been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial." See Companies Act, 1985,
§ 459.
161. Federal Court of Justice, decision of April 1, 1953, BGHZ 9, 157.
162. Id.
163. Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No. 3) [19941 1 BCLC 609, 611 [1994] BCC 766, 768
(Ch. Eng.) (involving a petition under Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 where the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant unfairly tried to exclude the plaintiff from the
business).
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through facts which have given rise to grievances but which are not relevant
conduct within even the wide words of the section. The section requires
these to have been conduct of 'the company's affairs...164
In a prior case, the Chancery Division Court denied a petition for
unfairly prejudicial conduct because the plaintiff complained of the
defendant's personal conduct rather than the defendant's conduct in the
affairs of the company. 165 In describing one of the plaintiffs claims, the
court indicated that the claim was:
an averment of a distasteful sort about thoroughly unattractive behavior by
the respondent. It is, I need not say, hotly denied. The truth or falsity of it is
not a matter before me. If it were all proved, it does not seem to me to have
anything whatever to do with the business of the company or the conduct of
the company's affairs. It is not alleged in it that there was any harm done to
the company or that the persons alleged to have suffered it knew of the
respondent's capacity in the company. It appears to be an attempt to
blacken the name and to make the court look on her with disfavor as an
immoral and unattractive woman; but it does not seem to me to amount to
anything that is properly a petition ground for the Companies Court.
UK law assumes a dichotomy between business and personal life,
whereas the German law recognizes no distinction. This important differ-
ence in perspective may be a source of confusion for international share-
holders. If the UK and German laws more dearly articulated standards for
misconduct, the law might better achieve its socializing and educational
goals in setting standards of conduct.
C. The Costs and Burdens of Shareholder Litigation: A Call for
Alternative Dispute Resolution Forums
A law with few limitations on the exercise of judicial discretion not only
produces the potential for abuse but also sets the stage for protracted,
lengthy and costly litigation. In light of the substantial costs of litigation,
consideration should be given to using alternative forums, such as arbitra-
tion, for the resolution of shareholder disputes.
The UK case of Re Elgindata, Ltd.166 serves to illustrate the extent to
which the costs of shareholder litigation may exceed the financial recovery
at stake in a private company. Further, the case demonstrates the highly
discretionary nature not only of the underlying cause of action in the UK,
but also of the allocation of litigation costs made by the judge hearing the
case.
Elgindata involved a petitioner who was a one-third minority share-
holder in a private U.K. company. The minority contended that the major-
ity failed to consult him in decisions, seriously mismanaged the business,
164. Id. at 767.
165. Re a company (No. 001761 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 141 (Ch. Eng.) (involving a
petition for unfairly prejudicial conduct which was denied because the complaint
focused on the defendant's personal behavior, rather than the behavior in the conduct of
the company's affairs).
166. [1993] 1 All E.R. 232 (C.A.). See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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and improperly made personal use of the company's assets. Ultimately,
the petitioner prevailed on one of four claims and the court ordered the
majority to buy the minority's shares for 24,000 pounds. However the peti-
tioner incurred legal costs of approximately 120,000 pounds and the
defendant sustained legal fees of approximately 200 pounds.' 67 The trial
lasted forty-three days. Further, although the general rule is that the
defendant pays the litigation fees of the successful plaintiff, the court in the
exercise of discretion required that the defendant pay only one-half of the
plaintiff's costs of litigation.168
The problems created by shareholder litigation in the UK dose corpo-
ration is perhaps best summarized by Justice Harmon as follows:
Petitions (under S. 459 involving prejudicial conduct) have become notori-
ous to the judges of this court-and I think also to the Bar-for their length,
their unpredictability of management, and the enormous and appalling costs
which are incurred upon them particularly by reason of the volume of docu-
ments liable to be produced. By way of example on this petition there are
before me upwards of 30 lever-arch files of documents. 169
The criticisms leveled at the UK law are echoed in the commentary to
comparable U.S. provisions designed to protect the minority against
"oppressive conduct" by the majority shareholders. 170 For example, in
Orchard v. Covelli,171 the plaintiff obtained a court order for the majority to
buy the plaintiffs stock. In addition to a buy-out price for the minority's
stock of $354,447, a total of $163,690 of pre-judgment interest was
required to be paid.172 In Stepahno v. Coppock,173 the defendant paid a
buy-out price of $32,000. In addition, eleven years of pre-judgment interest
was charged totaling $23,431. The attorney's fees in the case amounted to
$20,000.174
In light of the costs of litigation, alternative strategies for settling
shareholder disputes should be considered. Perhaps arbitration or other
informal forums may be used for controversies involving disputes where
the amounts in controversy are below pre-established levels. 175
D. The Rationale For Judicial Discretion in Resolving Close
Corporation Shareholder Disputes
Is it inevitable that the law governing shareholder remedies be vague,
highly discretionary, and culturally biased? A certain amount of discretion
167. Re Elgindata Ltd., [1993] 1 All E.R. 232.
168. Id.
169. Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No. 3) [1994] 1 BCLC 609, 611 [1994] BCC 766, 768
(Ch. Eng.) (involving a claim that the majority's conduct was unfairly prejudicial).
170. See Haynesworth, supra note 28, at 31.
171. 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 802 F. 2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986).
172. See Haynsworth, supra note 28, at 31 (discussing the practicality of shareholder
suits and related costs).
173. 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985).
174. Haynsworth, supra note 28, at 31.
175. Brownlee, supra note 96, at 274 (providing an overview of Florida's contractual
approach to oppressive conduct).
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is inevitable and probably desirable in litigation to resolve shareholder dis-
putes. Further, law is in essence an expression of culture and will always
reflect the assumptions and biases of the society from which it springs.
However, to increase the accountability of the judiciary, it may be possible
to temper judicial discretion with an articulation of standards which must
be applied in the decision-making process.
The importance of judicial discretion in resolving close corporation
shareholder disputes should not be underestimated. Judicial discretion
has been deliberately built into the law governing private company share-
holder disputes to provide an opportunity for fair and equitable resolutions
which might otherwise be precluded as the result of the application of the
general principles of corporate law. In the UK and the United States for
instance, the Majority Rule Doctrine and the Business Judgment Rule may
operate to preclude minority shareholders from obtaining remedies for
opportunistic majority conduct.176
Justice Hoffman, in the English case Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc,
explained that the term 'unfairly prejudicial' "is deliberately imprecise lan-
guage which was chosen by Parliament because its earlier attempt in s 210
of the Companies Act 1948 to provide a similar remedy had been too
restrictively construed." 177 Similarly, in the United States, the Statutory
Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corporation Act pro-
vides that "[a] court should have broad discretion to fashion the most
appropriate remedy to resolve the dispute. What works in one case may
not work in another. Detailed standards are not provided on the grounds
that such standards might ... unduly restrict the court's discretion."1 78
176. In the UKJustice Hoffman has observed that "[elnabling the court in an appro-
priate case to outflank the rule in Foss v. Harbotfle was one of the purposes of the
section (pertaining to the action for unfairly prejudicial conduct)." Re Saul D. Harrison
& Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (C.A. Eng.). The rule in Foss v. Harbottle states that in the
case of a wrong done to the company, the company is the proper plaintiff, and where a
wrong could be ratified by a majority of shareholders, no individual member could
bring an action. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. With regard to U.S. law, see
Bahls, supra note 13, at 292.
Unfortunately, two legal doctrines historically have served as barriers to remov-
ing inefficient or incompetent management. The first legal doctrine is the
Majority Rule Doctrine. The majority shareholders select the board thereby
effectively selecting management, and the minority shareholders have little
input into the process .... A second and related legal doctrine is the Business
Judgment Rule. It provides that courts will not second guess the decision of
management if it is reasonable to believe that management is acting in good
faith with a reasonable basis and within the scope of the power conferred to
them. As a result, the Business Judgment Rule creates thorny problems of proof
for the minority shareholder bringing a suit for breach of a director's duty of
care.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
177. [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17 (alleging that the majority directors kept the company in
business in order to earn remuneration even though the company was operating at a
loss and should have been liquidated).
178. 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN., Model Statutory Close Corp. Supp. § 41, cmt. (3d
ed. 1996).
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The perceived need for flexibility is based on the desire to address a
broad array of close corporation problems. However the breadth of the
remedies comes at a price-that is, the price of uncertainty and unpredict-
ability in the law and the potential for the arbitrary exercise of judicial
discretion. The challenge for the future is to provide a more effective bal-
ance between the need for certainty, predictability, and accountability, and
the competing need for equitable remedies which can be tailored to the
exigencies of the individual case.
E. To What Extent Can Contractual Arrangements Solve the Close
Corporation Problem?
Over the last decade, there has been a growing trend in U.S. business law to
discourage judicial activism and to encourage parties to contractually
address as many facets of their business relationship as possible. The
increased emphasis on contractual arrangements in U.S. business law has
manifested itself in: 1) the emergence of contractual provisions in corpo-
rate by-laws to indemnify directors who have been sued;179 2) the passage
of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act which arguably limits mandatory
fiduciary duties among partners and defers largely to the contract between
the parties; 180 and 3) the enactment of limited liability company legislation
179. In the seminal case, Smith v. Van Gorhom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), directors of
a publicly held company were held liable for violating their duty of care. The events that
followed in the wake of Smith v. Van Gorkom have been characterized as a "race to the
bottom." See Thomas L. Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race To The
Bottom- The Second Lap, 66 N.C. L. REy. 171 (1987) (discussing the lowering of legal
standards of conduct for corporate directors); Marc I. Steinberg, The Evisceration of the
Duty of Care, 42 S.W. L. REv. 919 (1988). Although the Van Gorkam case articulated a
relaxed gross negligence standard, many critics believed that the rule as applied in the
case was widely regarded as imposing Draconian liability where misconduct was only
slight. The majority of states enacted opt-out provisions which permit corporations to
indemnify directors who have been held liable to third parties. Some statutes, such as in
Delaware, authorize shareholders to adopt a charter provision which reduces or elimi-
nates financial responsibility except for certain cases involving unlawful conduct or
breaches of loyalty. See, e.g., DE.. GEN. Coiu. LAw. § 102(b)(7) (permitting indemnifica-
tion except for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve a knowing violation
of law, unlawful dividends or stock purchases, and transactions in which the director
derives a personal benefit.) Other states such as Florida, Maine, Ohio, Virginia and
Wisconsin eliminate due care liability without requiring charter provisions. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1645 (West 1996). New York has adopted a more conservative
approach and provides for relatively narrow circumstances in which indemnification
may be made. See N.Y. Bus. CoR'. L. § 402(b) (1987) (excluding transactions from
which an improper benefit is derived).
180. UN w. PARTNMSHip Act § 18, 6 U.L.A. 125 (1995) (1914) relies heavily on the
judiciary to address fiduciary duties. However, the standards of conduct found in the
U-I. TPARTmasmp Act (1994) § 404, 6 U.L.A. 1, 58 (1995) (RUPA), arguably reflect the
supremacy of the partnership agreement and the minimization of judicially-imposed
mandatory rules among partners. By limiting fiduciary duties to those expressly enu-
merated, RUPA turns away from broad statements of fiduciary duty which have long
been embraced by courts. Section 404 of the 1994 Act provides in part:
(a) The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other
partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in this section.
(b) A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is lim-
ited to the following:
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providing operating rules only in default of contractual agreements. 18'
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the
partnership business or derived from a use or appropriation by the partner of
partnership property or opportunity without the consent of the other
partners;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up
of the partnership business, as or on behalf of a party having an interest
adverse to the partnership without the consent of the other partners; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the part-
nership business before the dissolution of the partnership without the con-
sent of the other partners.
(c) A partner's duty of loyalty may not be eliminated by agreement, but the part-
ners by agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities that do
not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable.
(d) A partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the
conduct and winding up of the partnership business is limited to refraining
from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct,
or a knowing violation of law.
(e) A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the other partners
under this (Act) or under the partnership agreement and exercise any rights
consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The obligation of
good faith and fair dealing may not be eliminated in the agreement, but the
partners by agreement may determine the standards by which the performance
of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are not manifestly unrea-
sonable .... A partner may lend money to and transact other business with the
partnership. The rights and obligations of a partner who lends money to or
transacts business with the partnership are the same as those of a person who is
not a partner, subject to other applicable law.
(g) This section applies to a person winding up the partnership business as the
personal or legal representative of the last surviving partner as if the person
were a partner.
For an excellent discussion of RUPA, see Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Ani-
mate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAw. 427, 428 (1991). Weidner
explains the attempt to curb judicial activism as follows: "RUPA reflects the supremacy
of the partnership agreement and minimizes mandatory rules among partners." Id.
Weidener further notes that:
vague, broad statements of a powerful duty of loyalty cause too much uncer-
tainty. It was suggested that, even if there are no bad holdings, overly broad
judicial language had left practitioners uncertain about whether their negotiated
agreements will be voided. It was said that attorneys and their clients want to be
able to negotiate transactions, reduce their agreements to writing, and have
some comfort that those agreements will not be undone by "fuzzy" notions of
fiduciary duties.
Id. at 462.
181. See AL. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to 61 (1995); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010 to .995
(Michie 1995); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to 857 (West 1996); ARK. CODE ANN.
H8 4-32-10 to -1316 (Michie 1995); CAUF. CORP. CODE § 17000 to 17705 (West 1996);
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. H8 7-80-101 to 1101 (West 1995); ComN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-
100 to 242 (West 1995); DE. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 101 to 1107 (West Supp. 1995); D.C.
CODE ANN. H8 29-1301 to -1375 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. H8 608.401 to .514 (West 1994
& Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. H8 14-11-100 to 14-11-1109 (Michie 1996); HAw.REv.
STAT. §8 428.101 to 1302 (1997); IDAHO CODE §8 53-601 to 672 (1996); 805 ILL. COMP.
ANN. STAT. 180/1 to 180/60-1 (West. Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. H8 23-18-1 to 23-18-
12 (Michie 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.100 to .1601 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN.
H8 17-7601 to 7652 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001 to .455 (Michie Supp.
1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. H8 12-1301 to 1369 (West 1996); ME. R-v. STAT. ANN. tit. 31,
H8 601-762 (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CoRPs. & Ass'Ns 8§ 4A-101 to 4A-1103
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Similarly, in the dose corporation arena there has been a renewed empha-
sis on the important role of the contract between the parties. It has
recently been suggested that statutory measures providing for involuntary
dissolution of dose corporations are not needed where the corporate law
invites shareholders to contractually address the potential for shareholder
disputes. As one commentator noted in explaining why the legislature
should not enact minority shareholder legislation:
Thoughtfully designed shareholders' agreements deter oppressive conduct,
reduce shareholder disputes, and decrease litigation. Shareholder agree-
ments further force minority shareholders who bear the risk of losing an
investment to fend for themselves in the commercial arena .... (the) judiciary
should not add to its already congested plate the role of "protector" of unso-
phisticated investors. Courts should not interfere with arms length transac-
tions nor relieve shareholders from contractually bad bargains.' 82
Particularly for the international investor, well-drafted contractual
shareholder arrangements can be critical in governing the shareholder rela-
tionship. Contractually agreed upon choice of law provisions, buyout pro-
visions, provisions permitting minority veto power in certain
circumstances, employment contracts, and other special agreements which
provide for dividend payments or other matters are extremely helpful in
reducing potential shareholder disputes. Thus, contractual arrangements
should be encouraged in the case of corporations owned by shareholders
of different nations.
If it becomes necessary to litigate or arbitrate a shareholder dispute,
the judiciary should give paramount importance to relevant contractual
provisions agreed upon by the parties. In a recent UK case, the court
emphasized the primacy of the contractual arrangement between the par-
ties, which in that case was the articles of incorporation. As Justice Hoff-
man observes:
(1994 & Supp. 1995); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 156C, § 1 (Law Co-op. 1996); MicH. Comp.
LAws ANN. §§ 450.4101 to 450.5200 (West 1995); MniN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322.B.01 to .960
(West 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-6-1 to 79-6-39 (1993); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 347.010 to
347.740 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to 35-8-1307 (1995); NE. REv.
STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -2653 (Supp. 1995); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.010 to .571 (Michie
1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304C:1 to 304C:85 (1993); NJ. STAT. Am. §§ 42:2B-1 to
-70 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie 1996); N.Y. LTD. LiMB. Co.
IAw. §§ 101-1403 (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-1-01 to 57C-10-07 (1995);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -155 (1995); OHfo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01 to .58
(Anderson 1996); OK.- STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000 to 2060 (West 1995); Op. REv. STAT.
§§ 63.001 to .990 (1995); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8901 to 8998 (1995); R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 7-16-1 to-75 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN §§ 33-43-101 to -1409 (Law Co-op 1994);
S.D. CODiFim LAws §§ 47-34-1 to 47-34-59 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-201-
101 to -248-606 (Supp. 1995); TEc. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (West 1996); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 48-2a-207 to 48-2b-158(1994 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-
1000 to -1073 (Michie 1996); VT. H.B. 346 & S.B. 98 (authorizing limited liability com-
panies); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 25.15.005 to .902 (West 1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-
lA-1 to 31-1A-69 (Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102 to 183.1305 (West 1994);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to 136 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1996).
182. Brownlee, supra note 96, at'307.
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In deciding what is fair or unfair for the purposes of s 459 [determining
unfairly prejudicial conduct], it is important to have in mind that fairness is
being used in the context of a commercial relationship. The articles of asso-
ciation are just what their name implies: the contractual terms which govern
the relationships of the shareholders with the company and each other.
They determine the powers of the board and the company in general meeting
and everyone who becomes a member of a company is taken to have agreed
to them. Since keeping promises and honoring agreements is probably the
most important element of commercial fairness, the starting point in any
case under s 459 will be to ask whether the conduct of which the share-
holder complains was in accordance with the articles of association.1 83
Nevertheless, contractual provisions between the parties will not
always be equally relevant under all legal systems. Under UK or U.S. law,
contractual provisions may well be drafted to define each shareholder's
rights and responsibilities. In such event, it is difficult to disagree with the
statement that the court should use the contract as a starting point and
should defer to its provisions where relevant. Contractual provisions may
very well be quite relevant in the determination of whether a shareholder
acted improperly in the conduct of company affairs. However, an entirely
different situation is presented if the law is similar to Germany's and a
shareholder may obtain a remedy based not on the shareholder's pattern of
conduct in company affairs, but rather, based upon the shareholder's per-
sonal characteristics. It may be much more difficult to contractually antici-
pate all of the various personal characteristics and/or personality traits
which could legitimately become the basis of a shareholder lawsuit.
Even if the law is similar to UK and U.S. law and shareholder remedies
rest on a pattern of conduct in the company's affairs, the organizing docu-
ments and related contracts may not always help to resolve a shareholder
dispute. As a practical matter, the contractual documents may not specifi-
cally address the issues under dispute or may otherwise provide little gui-
dance for its resolution.
In many cases written contracts governing shareholder rights and
responsibilities may simply not exist.1 8 4 Small businesses may be con-
ducted informally even if they are owned by shareholders from different
countries and conduct business internationally. In fact, many small busi-
nesses are begun between friends or family members who have such a
close personal relationship that they do not even consider that disputes
could arise at a later time.' 8 5 Frequently, there are many aspects of the
business relationship which will not be memorialized in a contract.18 6 The
183. Re Saul D. Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17-18 (Eng. C.A.)
184. See Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa 1984) (minority shareholder
alleged in part that the majority wrongfully discharged him, yet there was no evidence of
the existence of a written or oral employment contract). The plaintiff was a stockholder
and officer of the corporation but his position did not make him a tenured employee. Id.
185. Meiselmanv. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551,558 (N.C. 1983) (explaining that close
corporations are formed by friends or family members who simply may not believe that
disagreements could ever arise).
186. McCauley v. McCauley, 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. App. 1986) (involving a lawsuit by a
divorced wife against her former husband, parental in-laws, and two sons alleging that
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agreement between the parties may be oral or may not even be articulated
at all. 187
Further, business relationships do not remain static. The roles of the
shareholders may change over time. Even if contracts were executed when
the business was formed, they may not have been updated to reflect the
changes in the roles of the parties. If documents are current, they may be
imperfectly drafted. The contracts may not address the matters which are
the subject of the shareholder dispute. 188
Particularly in the second or third generation of a family business, the
shareholders who have acquired the stock by inheritance may not have
entered any negotiations with respect to their roles in the business. 189 The
she had been ousted from the board and denied a voice in the company's affairs, and
that the defendants improperly failed to pay dividends and converted corporate assets to
personal use; nothing in company by-laws or contractual agreements between the parties
addressed the grievances at issue); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982)
(involving an action for dissolution of a family corporation). Neither the articles of
incorporation nor any other contractual documents were cited. Id. The complaint
focused largely on a failure to pay dividends. Id. In a number of cases alleging "oppres-
sive majority conduct," neither the plaintiff nor the defendant referred to the company's
articles of incorporation or to other contractual documents. See Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973) (involving exclusion of the plaintiff as an
employee of the corporation); Masinter v. Webco, 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980) (involv-
ing a squeeze-out of the minority shareholder from the Board of Directors). But see
Capital Toyota v. Gervin, 381 So.2d 1038 (Miss. 1980) (including a formal written con-
tract with the minority shareholder providing that his 25% stock interest was subject to
the condition that he be employed at retirement).
187. See O'Neal, supra note 7, at 884 (discussing the array of difficulties encountered
by the majority shareholders). Professor O'Neal, a leading authority on close corpora-
tions explains that
many participants in dosely-held corporations are "little people," unsophistica-
ted in business and financial matters. Not uncommonly a participant in a
closely-held enterprise invests all his assets in the business with an expectation,
often reasonable under the circumstances even in the absence of an express
contract, that he will be a key employee in the company and will have a voice in
business decisions.
Many close corporations may be conducted without the observance of corporate formali-
ties. See Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987) (the court observed that the
articles of incorporation had provided that a separate buy-sell agreement would be
entered into, but the parties never executed the buy-sell agreement).
188. Easterbrook and Fischel observed that some shareholder documents may be
intentionally written without provisions regarding minority shareholders because of the
risk that a judge might misconstrue or misinterpret provisions which protect the minor-
ity protections to the disadvantage of the majority. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 34, at 285.
Drafters of organizing documents of a closely held corporation cannot avoid a
tradeoff. On the one hand they must provide some protection to minority inves-
tors to ensure that they receive an adequate return on the minority shareholder's
investment if the venture succeeds. On the other hand, they cannot give the
minority too many rights, for the minority might exercise their rights in an
opportunistic fashion to claim returns at the majority's expense,
Id.
189. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558 (N.C. 1983), in which two
brothers had inherited their respective stock holdings from their father. The plaintiff
had inherited a minority interest and alleged that his brother violated his fiduciary duty.
The court explained that "the minority shareholder who acquired his shares to secure
419
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nature of the relationship between shareholders who have inherited their
shares of stock is seldom the product of arms length bargaining. The
understanding between such parties may be entirely oral or may be simply
implied by the circumstances.
Thus, the relevance of the contract to the resolution of shareholder
disputes depends largely on the nature of the law and the facts and circum-
stances of the individual case. Carefully drafted documents will not always
resolve the controversy. It has long been the experience of the bar that the
"easy cases" seldom reach the stage of litigation. It remains the task of the
legislature to provide effective default rules for the parties where the writ-
ten agreement does not resolve the conflict.
IV. The Feasibility of Harmonizing Close Corporation Dispute
Resolution in the European Community
Given the diversity of approaches to close corporation shareholder dispute
resolution, and the vague judicial concepts employed in different jurisdic-
tions, is it feasible for the European Union to adopt standardized rules
which provide increased guidance to the business community? While the
European Union has the authority to establish minimum safeguards of
company law, it never intended to displace broadly company law of mem-
ber states. While minimum safeguards have been successfully passed in a
number of areas, standards of shareholder and director conduct may well
be regarded as matters traditionally within the scope of local discretion
and local regulation by member states. A substantive proposal to stand-
ardize the law regarding the resolution of private company shareholder dis-
putes is likely to be perceived as an unauthorized encroachment into the
sovereignty of member states.
A variety of corporate regulations have been passed by the European
Community. Indeed, the harmonization of corporate law is clearly within
the mission of the European Community. Broadly stated, the task of the
European Community, as stated in the Treaty of Rome is to "promote
throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of
economic activities," a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in
stability, an accelerated "raising of the standard of living" and closer rela-
tions between the States belonging to it.190
Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty of Rome expressly provides for the coor-
dination of necessary "safeguards" applicable to companies and firms in
order to make them equivalent throughout the Community. 191 While the
Treaty authorizes the passage of "safeguards" it does not broadly call for
his position with the firm may have lacked sufficient bargaining power to force the
majority to agree to terms which would enable him to protect his interests." Id. at 558.
190. See EEC TREATY, art. 2.
191. Id. § 54(3)(g). The treaty authorizes the adoption of a series of Directives for the
purpose of "coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, but for the pro-
tection of members and others, are required by Member Sates of companies and firms
... with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community." Id.
420
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the displacement of corporate law of member states.192 Perhaps with the
exception of the Draft Fifth Directive, the Community founders generally
rejected the approach to uniformity taken by the United States through its
variety of "uniform acts" and through the Model Business Corporation
Act 1 93 Although the U.S. move toward uniformity has been voluntary, it
provides a comprehensive model of corporate law. 194 In contrast, the
instrument of harmonization in the European Community is the binding
"directive."'195 The Directive dictates the result to be achieved, but leaves
the form and method of implementation to each member state. 196
The European Community has been successful in developing a variety
of "safeguards" for companies which are scattered throughout a number of
directives. 197 The primary areas which have been addressed include: 1)
the requirement that each member state create a public registry at which
key private and public company information must be filed;198 2) the dis-
closure by private and public companies of the creation and maintenance
of capital; 199 3) minimum standards for all aspects of financial accounting
192. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 2162-63 (emphasizing that there were a number of
reasons why the Community did not wish to enact a uniform law including the enormity
of the task, the inconvenience it would cause, the disparagement of national traditions
which would be implied, the duplication of bureaucracies which would result, and the
administrative difficulties of dealing with documents in several languages).
193. Id. at 2159-60 (comparing the U.S. and EC approach to uniformity of business
laws).
194. See generally BRANSON, supra note 141 (providing a thorough analysis of corpo-
rate governance in the United States with emphasis on the duty of care and the business
judgment rule); PAT K. CHEw, Dumcrons' Aum OimcEas' LIA nmr (1996) (focusing on
decision-making in corporate America, indemnification and insurance matters, and
emerging areas of liabilities); Conrad, supra note 3, at 2162.
195. See Terence L. Blackburn, The Unification of Corporate Laws: The United States,
the European Community and the Race to Laxity, 3 GEo. MASON IuN '. L. REv. 1 (1994)
(discussing the techniques employed by the European Community to unify laws vith
particular emphasis on the harmonization of corporate laws).
196. See EEC TanATY art. 189. Charles M. Harris, The European Community's Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, 9 FLA.J. INT'L L 111-17 (1994) (indicating that the legal basis of the
secondary law developed by the European Council is Article 189 of the EEC Treaty).
Article 189 provides the Council and the Commission with legislative powers including
power to enact regulations, directives, decisions and recommendations and opinions.
Id.
197. See Conrad, supra note 6, at 2169 (explaining that the directives are found in a
pattern that reflects the order in which national representatives reached consensus on
successive points, rather than in any logical order).
198. Council Directive No. 8/151, 1968 (L 65) 8, reprinted in 1 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 'I 1351B (1988) (requiring: 1) public and private companies to disclose the
instrument of constitution and statutes and any amendment; 2) the appointment, termi-
nation of office, and particulars of those authorized to represent the company in deal-
ings with third parties and in legal proceedings, or involved in the administration,
supervision or control of the company; 3) the amount of capital; 4) the annual accounts
with the details regarding the persons registered by law to certify the balance sheet; 5)
any transfer of the seat of the company; 6) the winding up, declaration of nullity, the
appointment of liquidators or termination of the company).
199. Id. See also LucIE A. CARSELL & XAVIER DE SARRAu, LAw & BusiNEss IN -H EURo-
PEAN SINGI MARKEr § 4.0211][a] (1993) (describing the First Directive regarding its dis-
closure requirements). See Conrad, supra note 3, at 2172 (indicating that public and
private companies must disclose annually the amount of subscribed capital. Public
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for public and private companies; 200 4) rules regarding mergers 201 and
divisions;20 2 and takeovers;203 and 5) guidelines for one-member compa-
nies.20 4 In addition, a legal entity called the European Economic Interest
Grouping (EEIG) 205 has been established through which companies from
different Community states may conduct business transactions. 20 6
companies must maintain 25,000 ECU ($25,000) but private companies have no
minimum).
200. See Council Directive 78/660/EEC, 1978 Oj. (L 222) 11, reprinted in 1 Com-
mon Mkt Rep. (CCH) c 1371 (1988) (Fourth Directive) (specifying requirements for
financial reporting). While the Fourth Directive's rules are less stringent than their SEC
counterpart, they apply broadly to private as well as public companies. Two different
systems apply to public and private companies, but even the abridged information
required for private companies is substantial. Further, although the Model Business
Corporation Act only requires that a company maintain appropriate accounting records,
the Fourth Directive requires private as well as public companies to be audited. See
Conrad, supra note 3, at 2175 (1991) (including a detailed discussion of the require-
ments of the Fourth Directive).
201. Council Directive 78/885/EEC, 1982 Oj. (L 295) 36, reprinted in 1 Common
MkL Rep. (CCH) '1 1361 (1988) (Third Directive) (addressing mergers). See also Propo-
sal for a Tenth Council Directive on cross-border mergers of public limited liability com-
panies, 1985 Oj. (C 23) 11, reprinted in 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) q 1439 (1985).
202. Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 1982 Oj. (L 378) 47, reprinted in 1 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1411 (1982) (Sixth Directive) (dealing with divisions or split-ups).
See also Council Directive 89/592 on Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing,
1989 Oj. (L 334) 30 (mandating the member states of the European Union to enact
insider-trading legislation). See Dariusz M. Budzen & Ania M. Frankowska, Prohibitions
Against Insider Trading in the United States and the European Community: Providing Gui-
dance for Legislatures of Eastern Europe, 12 B.U. INr'L LJ. 91 (1994) (comparing the
insider trading rules in the United States and the European Community). See also Ron-
ald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing The European
Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FoiwAmu L. REv. 161 (1992) (discussing the pro-
posal to harmonize the laws on insider trading within the European Community); Ste-
phen J. Leacock, In Search of A Giant Leap: Curtailing Insider Trading in International
Securities Markets by the Reform of Insider Trading Laws Under European Union Council
Directive 89/592, 3 TuLSAJ. Comp. & IN'rL L. 51 (1995); DanielJames Standen, Insider
Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracing for the Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 177 (discussing the response of the United States and the European Commu-
nity to insider trading). Lynda M. Ruiz, European Community Directive on Insider Deal-
ing: A Model for Effective Enforcement of Prohibitions on Insider Trading in International
Securities Markets, 33 COLUM. J. TANSNAT'L L. 217 (1995) (providing a review of the
insider trading rules in the United States and the European Community).
203. Amended Commission proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive 1990 Oj. (C
240) 7, reprinted in 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) q 60,200 (1990) (concerning takeover
and general bids). See Clas Bergstom et al., The Regulation of Corporate Acquisitions: A
Law and Economics Analysis of European Proposals for Reform, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
495 (analyzing the takeover laws in Italy, France, Germany, and other European coun-
tries and the proposed Thirteenth Directive to monitor corporate takeovers).
204. Council Directive 89/667/EEC, 1989 Oj. (L 395) 40, reprinted in 1 Common
MkL Rep. (CCH) c 1447 (Twelth Directive) (setting forth standards for one-member
companies).
205. Commission Regulation 2137/87, 1985 Oj. (L 199) 1.
206. The EEIG is a legal entity which is governed by Community rules. It permits
businesses from different member states to conduct business through the EEIG. How-
ever, the members of the EEIG are completely autonomous from the EEIG and the mem-
bers are jointly and severally liable for the debts and liabilities of the EEIG. The purpose
of the entity is to facilitate collaboration of business enterprises from different states.
Businesses from different states may work through the EEIG while still maintaining their
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Nevertheless, in spite of the many areas in which the Community has
had success, it has always been reluctant to broadly displace existing cor-
porate laws in member states. 207 The Community's difficulty in obtaining
passage of the Fifth Directive relating to corporate governance and its com-
panion European Statute is an indication of the members' general reluc-
tance to relinquish authority over corporate matters which have
traditionally fallen within their own discretion.20 The Fifth Directive
offers a choice between a one-tier system of corporate law and a two-tier
system. 209 The one-tier approach provides for management by the Board
of Directors while the two-tier approach provides both a Board of Directors
and a Supervisory Board based on the German/French model of govern-
ance. 210 The Directive requires the representation of employees in man-
agement and establishes a standard for Director conduct.211 A companion
independence and without undergoing mergers of any type. At present, the EEIG is not
widely used, but has been employed largely by professional groups such as lawyers and
public relations consultants who wish to pool their resources. See C-AsEu. & DE SaR-
RAu, supra note 199, § 4.09[3] (providing an overview of the EEIG and indicating that it
is patterned after the French Groupement d'interet Economique). See also Johan de
Bruycker, EC Company Law-The European Company v. The European Economic Interest
Grouping and the Harmonization of the National Company Laws, 21 GA. J. INT'L & CO-W.
L. 191 (1991) (examining harmonization efforts and including a discussion of the Euro-
pean Economic Interest Grouping).
207. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 2171-72 (explaining that the Treaty authorized coor-
dinating only "safeguards" and coordinating only "to the necessary extent").
208. The European Company Statute, 1989 Oj. (C 263) 41; 1991 Oj. (C 138) 8;
1991 Oj. (C 176) 1.
209. This approach is similar to that under French law whereunder the French public
corporation is given a choice between the one and two-tier system of management.
210. For an excellent discussion of the role of the Supervisory Board, see Alfred F.
Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in
European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1459, 1465 (1984) (indi-
cating that industrial countries outside of the United States have required publicly held
companies to provide for supervision of managers). Conrad indicates that in Germany,
the Supervisory Board hires and fires the managers, sets compensation, and supervises
management. Id. The Supervisory Board under German and French law dates from
1870 and 1863 respectively.
211. The Draft Fifth Directive provides a system of corporate governance. A compan-
ion European Company Statute has been drafted to go along with the Fifth Directive.
See The European Company Statute, 1989 Oj. (C 263) 41; 1991 Oj. (C 138) 8; 1991
Oj. (C 176) 1. Thus far, the Proposals have not been adopted primarily because of
political opposition from the United Kingdom. The Fifth Directive's provisions relating
to employee participation in management are a significant concern to the United King-
dom. See Breskovski, supra note 89, at 91 n.104. See also CAgsELL & DE SARuau, supra
note 199, § 4.05 (discussing the original and revised Fifth Directive); Barbara E. Hoeck-
lin, European Company Statute: Company Structure and Employee Involvement Across EC
Borders, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. 587 (1991) (discussing the history of the European
Company Statute, the provisions for employee involvement, and opposing traditions for
employee involvement in Germany and the UK); John T. Addison, Recent Developments
in Social Policy in the New European Union, 48 INDus. &. LAB. Rav. 5 (1994) (discussing
the social and labor policy in the European Community); Terence L. Blackburn, The
Societas Europea: The Evolving European Corporation Statute, 61 FoRDHM L. REv. 695
(1993) (reviewing the history of the Fifth Directive in light of the history of the different
legal traditions within the European Community); Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation
on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems For Corporate Governance and Economic Inte-
gration in Europe, 14 INT'L REy. L. & EcoN. 203 (1994) (discussing the legal and eco-
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European Statute has been drafted which follows exactly the Draft Direc-
tive.212 The Directive and related European Statute has met with consider-
able controversy.213 One commentator described reaction to the initial
version of the Fifth Directive as "an assault on national folkways . . .
[which] awakened expectable resistance in member states."214
The creation of a uniform approach to shareholder dispute resolution
may well be regarded as an intrusion into the domain of members' existing
corporate law, rather than as an effort to establish a minimum corporate
"safeguard."215 Even if a workable model for dispute resolution could be
developed, it is likely to be met with resistance, particularly in light of the
current diversity in approach to the shareholder disputes, and the discre-
tionary nature of existing laws.
V. Strategies for Close Corporation Dispute Resolution in the
European Community
While it does not appear to be feasible or indeed appropriate for the Com-
munity to harmonize substantive company laws governing close corpora-
tion shareholder dispute resolution, at a minimum, discussion of the issues
could prove useful to member states. An agenda for discussion and analy-
sis should include: 1) the role of contractual agreements in resolving
shareholder disputes; 2) the potential use of arbitration and alternative
cost-effective forums for shareholder dispute resolution; and 3) the future
revision of company statutes to articulate the criteria for fashioning share-
holder remedies in the close corporation context.
nomic effects of the German and Dutch Co-determination model); Craig L. Jackson,
Social Policy Harmonization and Worker Rights in the European Union: A Model For North
America?, 21 N.C. J. INr'L L. & CoM. REG. 1 (1995) (discussing the social policy of the
European Community with emphasis on worker rights). For an interesting discussion
of the interests that employees, customers, suppliers, and other nonshareholders have in
corporate decision-making, see Marleen A. O'Connor, Symposium: Corporate Malaise-
Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 SMTSON L. REv. 3 (1991); Clyde W. Summers,
Worker Dislocation: Who Bears The Burden? A Comparative Study of Social Values in Five
Countries, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1033 (1995) (comparing the way in which the United
States, UK, Germany, Sweden, and Japan respond to the problems of instability in
employment).
212. Because the provisions of the Statute follow the Draft Directive the discussion is
limited to the Draft Directive, although it should be kept in mind that there is a compan-
ion European Statute. See Breskovski, supra note 89, at 91 n.104 (discussing the stan-
dards of director conduct under the Fifth Directive and explaining the similarity
between the Draft Directive and the European Statute).
213. See Bridget Montgomery, The European Community's Draft Fifth Directive: British
Resistance and Community Procedures 10 Comp. LAB. LJ. 429 (1989) (discussing the con-
troversy in the European Community revolving around the Fifth Directive).
214. Conrad, supra note 3, at 2182. See also CagSwmL & DE SAuuAu, supra note 199,
at 4-53 (providing an overview of the harmonization of company law in the European
Community); Hoecklin, supra note 211, at 587 (describing company corporate struc-
tures in the European Community); Blackburn, supra note 211, at 695 (discussing the
need for a European Corporate Statute).
215. See Clark D. Stith, Comment, Federalism and Company Law: A "Race To the Bot-
tom" in the European Community, 79 GEo. Lj. 1581 (1991) (discussing the competing
trends toward uniformity and diversity among members of the European Community).
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Strategies to promote the use of contractual shareholder remedies
should be considered. Perhaps company laws could require or otherwise
encourage the use of by-laws or other separate shareholder agreements to
address the manner in which shareholder disputes would be resolved.
Contractual provisions could specify the circumstances which would trig-
ger a shareholder remedy and the mode for dispute resolution.
Thus far, at least one state in the United States has enacted a corporate
statute which is designed to encourage close corporation shareholders to
contractually address the issue of shareholder disputes. In 1993, Florida's
legislature enacted a provision which specifically provides investors in cor-
porations with one hundred or fewer shareholders the right to contractu-
ally protect themselves against oppressive behavior, squeeze-outs and other
unexpected occurrences. 216
Alternative forums for dispute resolution should be considered. 21 7
Arbitration or other non-judicial methods for dispute resolution could be
used. If shareholder by-laws already contain buy-out provisions using a
fixed formula, or otherwise contain guiding principles for resolving share-
holder disputes, judicial intervention may not be needed.
216. FLA STAT. ANN. § 607.0732(1) (West 1996), providing:
Shareholder Agreements
(1) An agreement among the shareholders of a corporation with 100 or fewer
shareholders at the time of the agreement, that complies with this section, is
effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it is inconsis-
tent with one or more other provisions of this chapter, if it:
(a) Eliminates the board of directors or restricts the discretion or powers of
the board of directors;
(b) Governs the authorization or making of distributions whether or not in
proportion to ownership of shares subject to the limitations in s. 607.06401;
(c) Establishes who shall be directors or officers of the corporation, or their
terms of office or manner of selection or removal;
(d) Governs, in general or in regard to specific matters, the exercise or divi-
sion of voting power by the shareholders and directors, including use of
weighted voting rights or director proxies;
(e) Establishes the terms and conditions of any agreement for the transfer or
use of property or the provision of services between the corporation and any
shareholder, director, officer, or employee of the corporation;
(f) Transfers to any shareholder or other person any authority to exercise the
corporate powers to manage the business and affairs of the corporation,
including the resolution of any issue about which there exists a deadlock
among directors or shareholders; or
(g) Requires dissolution of the corporation at the request of one or more of
the shareholders or upon the occurrence of a specified event or contingency.
See also Brownlee, supra note 96, at 295 (discussing the role of the contract in resolving
shareholder disputes).
217. See id. for a critique of Florida's treatment of minority shareholders.
Shareholders caught in a squeeze-out or an oppression dilemma usually either
want to withdraw their capital from the corporation or alter the balance of
power within the corporation itself because of policy disputes. Both of these
options can be achieved without judicial dissolution. The most economical
alternative is the shareholders' agreement. Shareholders' agreements deter
oppressive conduct, reduce shareholder disputes, and decrease litigation.
Id.
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Of course, not all problems can be anticipated, and not all contracts
will properly address the particular controversy. More effective statutory
default rules should be drafted to more clearly identify the factors that are
relevant in the determination of whether a shareholder is entitled to a rem-
edy in the event of a dispute. In his opinion in Re Saul Harrison & Sons,
Justice Hoffman emphasized the importance of the identification of factors
which the court uses to evaluate shareholder conduct. Justice Hoffman
observes that:
In explaining how the court sets about deciding what is fair in the context of
company management, I do not think that it helps a great deal to add the
reasonable company watcher to the already substantial cast of imaginary
characters which the law uses to personify its standards of justice in differ-
ent situations. An appeal to the views of an imaginary third party makes the
concept seem more vague than it really is. It is more useful to examine the
factors which the law actually takes into account in setting the standard.218
Currently, the French company statute provides for dissolution for
"valid reasons."219 A revised version might provide a list of factors which
the court would consider in determining whether valid reasons exist. The
list need not be exhaustive but would give investors some idea of the stan-
dards against which they will be judged. Similarly, the German GmbH stat-
ute could provide a list of factors which would be used in reaching the
conclusion that "substantial causes" exist for a withdrawal or expulsion.
The UK statute could also identify the factors to be considered in the deter-
mination of whether "unfairly prejudicial conduct" has taken place.
For example, in an effort to elaborate on factors in the determination
of "unfairly prejudicial conduct," the UK statute might indicate that a
determination of "unfairly prejudicial" conduct would be based on all of
the facts and circumstances and would take a number of factors into
account. These would include but not be limited to: 1) the nature of the
conduct which took place; 2) the motive of the conduct; 3) the nature of the
damages; and 4) the reasonable expectations of the parties based on appli-
cable commercial standards. The statute might provide a non-exhaustive
list of acts which would be presumed to be prejudicial conduct. Of course,
the defendant would be entitled to rebut the presumption. Such a list of
acts might include the personal use of corporate assets; withholding of divi-
dends without business purpose; excessive compensation to the majority
without business purpose; withholding information regarding the com-
pany; violating corporate procedures; depriving the other shareholder(s) of
a meaningful role in corporate decision-making; usurping a corporate
opportunity for personal use; and executing corporate business plans that
wrongfully deprive the other shareholders of their respective shares in cor-
porate profits. 2 20
218. Re Saul D. Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17 (C.A. Eng.).
219. Supra note 148.
220. See Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (1984) (outlining the various
tactics used to squeeze-out minority shareholders).
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It is difficult to accept any legal approach to dispute resolution which
rests solely on judicial discretion in applying vague legal concepts. To pro-
vide a framework within which judicial discretion must be exercised, the
applicable statute should identify the factors which will be applied in evalu-
ating whether the aggrieved shareholder is entitled to a remedy. Such an
approach would enhance the predictability of the law and increase the
accountability of the judiciary without compromising each country's rights
to determine their own substantive laws.
Conclusion
A review of the "close corporation problem" in Germany, the UK, and
France finds that vague standards of shareholder conduct and highly dis-
cretionary remedies exist for resolving disputes among shareholders of the
private company. The potential for abuse is illustrated by the German
experience with the expulsion remedy. Vague legal concepts regarding
shareholder misconduct may increase rather than reduce the international
shareholder's confusion regarding the scope of acceptable conduct. While
some amount of judicial discretion in the law is necessary to provide flexi-
bility in fashioning remedies, existing approaches fail to provide any mean-
ingful limitations or guidelines for the exercise of discretion. The adoption
of a comprehensive and unified approach to close corporation shareholder
remedies for the European Community does not appear feasible. However,
at a minimum, member states would benefit from discussion and analysis
of the role of contractual agreements in resolving private company share-
holder disputes, and the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
Consideration should be given to revising existing statutes to include an
elaboration of the factors which will be applied in determining the entitle-
ment to a remedy. The importance of flexibility in fashioning remedies
must be balanced against the competing needs for certainty, predictability,
and accountability in the administration of the law.

